Essays in Public and Nonprofit Financial Management by Ghosh Moulick, Abhisekh
ESSAYS IN PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
A Dissertation
by
ABHISEKH GHOSH MOULICK
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chair of Committee, Kenneth J. Meier
Committee Members, Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon
Manuel P. Teodoro
Lori L. Taylor
Head of Department, William R. Clark
December 2015
Major Subject: Political Science
Copyright 2015 Abhisekh Ghosh Moulick
ABSTRACT
There are three primary goals of financial management: to help a firm weather envi-
ronmental turbulence, to allow a firm to grow, and to make safe revenue choices to keep
a firm operational. What is often disregarded in this discussion is organizational context.
In this dissertation, I argue that we cannot manage finances in all organizations the same
way.
Organizational context matters for money management. Specifically, by organizational
context I mean if a firm is a public, for-profit, or nonprofit entity. Organizational context
shapes the winners and losers in resource distribution and hence fundamentally alters key
expectations from various financial management tools and techniques. To demonstrate
this, I address three questions related to each aspect of financial management. First, can
fiscal slack help buffer budget shocks in public organizations? Second, does financial
performance motivate risk taking in nonprofit, for innovation and growth? Finally, can
revenue sourcing strategies affect key outcomes in decentralized public organizations?
I use twenty years of data from over a thousand public school districts in Texas. I
use ordinary least squares regression models with year fixed effects. First, I empirically
demonstrate that fiscal slack alone cannot fully counterbalance the negative impact of 10
percent or greater budget shocks on aggregate district standardized test performance. How-
ever, districts with approximately 31.53 percent fund balance (unabsorbed fiscal slack) can
reduce the negative impact of budget shocks more effectively than districts with minimum,
or just 0.05 percent, fund balance. But the distinction of slack as an effective buffer in for-
profits, in much less pronounced in public firms.
Second, I offer a theoretical discussion of how an increase in financial performance
may induce nonprofits to take more risks. This is in sharp contrast to their for-profit coun-
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terparts. Decline in financial performance is the key motivation for for-profit firms to
innovate and take risks. But given the nondistribution constraint and the lack of profit mo-
tivation, when nonprofits are financially secure they would be induced to take more risk.
Finally, I empirically investigate achievement gap based on income, a key outcome,
in the highly decentralized US K-12 education system. Decentralization is expected to
offer welfare enhancing opportunities, by allowing school policies to be tailored to small
homogeneous student groups. I find that when more revenue is generated locally, more ad-
ministrative decentralization can increase income-based achievement gap. Revenue source
is less important in private organizations that actively seek to diversify revenue bases.
These three separate conclusions together substantiate the key thesis that organiza-
tional context fundamentally alters outcomes and expectations from various money man-
agement choices in firms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Organizations are living breathing systems that bring together various actors, both
internal and external, who work towards a common goal. Alternatively, as Cyert and
March (1963) argue, organizations are coalition of actors, and aggregated goals of coali-
tion members manifest as organizational goals (Cyert and March 1963). Either way, if
an organization fails to achieve its purported goals, it runs the risk of decline, failure,
and demise.1 With a multiplicity of actors, and their numerous, often conflicting inter-
ests, arise the potential for discord and conflict. Effective management of such a system,
then, involves ironing out challenges that may arise in the process of inducing actors in
this coalition to act cohesively to achieve organizational goals. Since actors respond to
incentives, the key function of organizational leadership, then, is to ensure that actors are
incentivized appropriately and that these incentives align them with the goals of the orga-
nization. To incentivize actors, organizations harness internal and external resources. In
this regard, money is a critical organizational resource.
Financial decisions impact every aspect of an organization. Furthermore, money is
finite and fungible. In other words, every organization has a limited supply of this key re-
source and money designated for one purpose may in essence be used for another purpose.
These two features create some unique challenges for financial managers. Allocation of
finite fiscal resources in an organization creates winners and losers. Thus, a lot is re-
vealed through the study of financial management practices of an organization. A rich and
growing body of literature explores this complex incentive structure that fiscal bargaining
1The population ecology view of organizations, such as the one proposed in the seminal work of Hannan
and Freeman (1977), offers a slightly different explanation for the birth, growth, and decay trajectory of
organizations. But it is compatible with the key premise of organizational development here.
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creates in organizations and that impacts the outputs of private or for-profit firms. But the
same cannot be said for other organizational types.
In modern societies, majority of goods and services are produced by “formalized
entities.” (Jegers 2008, 5) 2 These entities, in turn, may be owned by either governments
or private entities. 3 Organizations run by a government entity is a public organization.
Private ownership of organizations can be further divided into two categories. First, or-
ganizations that allow owners to increase their financial wealth using their earned profits
and those that operate under a non-distribution of profit constraint (Jegers 2008, 6-7). For-
profits fall in the first category and are essentially motivated by wealth maximization for
their owners. Nonprofits fall in the second category. Public and nonprofit organizations
provide goods and services that for-profit firms are unwilling or unable to provide (Mike-
sell 2013). The list of goods and services provided by public and nonprofit organizations
is long, and includes healthcare, education, and public safety, to name just a few.
Despite the importance of the services provided by the government and the third
sector, the majority of our knowledge about financial management in organizations is built
around our understanding of for-profit firms. If we look at the shelves of a book store
(or an online version of it), we will see that for every text book on public financial man-
agement or nonprofit financial management, there are at least ten text books on corporate
finance. This means that we do not have enough resources out there to train the next gen-
erations of public and nonprofit managers, who can fully appreciate the unique challenges
of their organizations. The premise of this problem is the assumption that we can extend
our understanding of financial management policies and practices in private organizations,
with some adjustments, to further our knowledge of how best to manage finances in public
2These goods and services may include the “promotion of ideas, ideologies, or religions.” (Jegers 2008,
5)
3There are also cross sectoral partnerships, such as public-private partnerships that is a fairly common
phenomenon today. But for the purpose of this dissertation, I consider only pure public, for-profit, and
nonprofit organizations.
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or non-profit organizations.
Jegers (2008, 110) argues that once we have accounted for the nondistribution con-
straint, nonprofit financial management will not be remarkably different from for-profit
financial management. The new public management revolution also attempted to extrap-
olate practices and paradigms of for-profit management to public organizations. But if
financial management is about aligning fiscal resources within an organization to incen-
tivise actors in the organizational coalition, then the context of organization, that is if it is
for-profit, nonprofit, or public, should fundamentally change what financial management
practices look like in each of these organization types. This is because, organizational
context sets the organizational goals, rules of the game, the incentives for actors, and,
the winners and losers in the group bargaining process that determines the way the fiscal
pie is shared within an organizational coalition. While all organizations can be managed,
how we manage them and how management choices will impact organizational outcomes
will be conditioned by the context. The three essays in this dissertation attempt to demon-
strate how our efforts to effectively harness financial resource to meet organizational goals,
which is the primary concern of financial management research, is highly restricted unless
we account for the unique challenges and opportunities that publicness or nonprofitness
of an organization creates. In other words, organizational context matters in the study of
financial management.
1.2 Overview
Finances are the fuel that runs an organization. Financial management scholars
study how we generate and use money effectively, to meet organizational goals. In this
regard, we can think of three key financial management goals: to stay in operation, to
grow, to weather environmental turbulence. To stay operational any organization must
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generate revenue. Organizations must ideally have a revenue source that is sustainable and
diversified, such that it is not dependent on a single revenue base.4 Once, an organization
has charted a clear path to sustain itself, it may then focus on growth, through innova-
tion and risk-taking. Sometimes growth is a choice, but most often than not it is a means
to stay relevant in a constantly changing environment. Finally, organizations constantly
face environmental turbulence that they must protect themselves from. Organizations al-
locate resources to create a safety net around itself to weather turbulence. In three separate
essays, I demonstrate how each of these organizational goals translate to financial man-
agement challenges and, most importantly, how dealing with these challenges is highly
context dependent.
I begin by addressing the issue of organizational turbulence in the second chapter.
Organizations of all shapes, forms, and sizes, have to worry about vicissitudes of the envi-
ronment. An example of environmental turbulence, would be a fiscal turbulence, such as
a negative budget shock due to unforeseen changes in revenue stream. Since these unfore-
seen circumstances are inevitable, organizations make contingency arrangements. Slack
resources within an organization are supposed to offer a protective shield around organi-
zations at times of such turbulence. Fiscal slack reserve is supposed to help deflect the
negative impact of a budget shock on organizational performance. But for-profit literature
leads us to believe that not all slack resources are the same. While some slack reserves
are positively linked to organizational performance, thus act as an effective organizational
buffer, other slack resources may be merely a manifestation of organizational inefficiency.
This literature has identified the first as unabsorbed slack and the latter as absorbed slack.
The notion of absorbed and unabsorbed slack in public organizations is a useful addition.
But, most importantly, the implication of this concept varies remarkably from slack stud-
ied in for-profit firms. Unabsorbed slack is undesignated excess resources that for-profit
4For-profits establish multiple product lines to accomplish this goal.
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managers can re-allocate easily. In public organizations, excess slack resources creates
political pressures, say for tax cuts (Rose and Smith 2011). The wider political context
matters to for-profit managers to the extent that it gets in the way of them catering to the
shareholder interest. But for managers in public organizations, it is their stock in trade, as
they serve a wider society and cater to major public needs. Public managers cannot easily
create unabsorbed fund reserves as designated excess resource, without political reper-
cussions. Even when they do create unabsorbed slack reserves, such as unreserved fund
balance, it is unclear if they can use these monies effectively to completely deflect the neg-
ative impact of downward budgetary shocks on performance. Additionally, performance
for public organizations is not straightforward, say maximizing return on investments, but
a more complex set of goals, such as providing K-12 education or primary healthcare to as
many individuals in the society as possible. Thus, this essay hopes to start a dialogue about
how various organizational safety nets should be effectively managed, while accounting
for the organizational context.
The third chapter continues to demonstrate how context matters in the study of fi-
nancial management, by wrestling with the another financial management challenge: fos-
tering organizational growth and innovation through risk-taking. Decline in financial per-
formance is the key motivation for for-profit firms to innovate and take risks, so that they
may reach, or exceed, pre-decline levels of financial performance (Bromiley 1991; Singh
1986). Thus, there is usually a negative relationship between financial performance and
risk taking in for-profit organizations. But risk taking is also context dependent (Shapira
1995, 25). This chapter demonstrates that when we move the performance-risk discussion
to the context of nonprofit organizations, the key assumptions and expectations about this
relationship changes. Like public organizations, nonprofits cater to a much wider set of
clientele. As (Adelino, Lewellen, and Sundaram 2015, 1583) argue, a nonprofit may serve
donors who fund it, the community in which it operates, and the society at large- often-
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times all of them simultaneously. The list of different actors involved in nonprofits, then,
is remarkably greater than even a major corporation with a large number of share-holders.
Nonprofits are generally risk averse (Hull and Lio 2006). Unlike for-profits, when finan-
cially vulnerable, a nonprofit will stay away from choices that involve risk and innovation.
But with robust finances, a nonprofit would take more risks and try to serve a larger con-
stituency than before. This is a new theoretical addition to the performance-risk link, that
hinges upon the argument that organizational context alters goals and challenges associ-
ated with financial management in fundamental ways.
The fourth chapter, offers the final piece of evidence to support the claim that or-
ganizational context is crucial in the study of financial management. Studies of private
organizations, both for-profits and nonprofits, have demonstrated that revenue diversifica-
tion is beneficial for organizations. It harkens back to the adage of not putting all eggs in
one basket. But the strings that come attached with revenue sources may have major rami-
fications for public organizations, than what we would see in for-profits or even nonprofits.
In this essay, I look at the context of the most dominant public organization systems in the
US, public schools and one of their key goals, which is to reduce achievement gaps be-
tween student groups. In a heavily decentralized US public school system, it is believed
that administrative decentralization will enhance equity and reduce achievement gaps. But
placing more administrators on school campuses may increase the achievement gap be-
tween low-income students and their peers. While a battery of factors may contribute to
this problem, I argue they all stem primarily from “elite capture.” (Bardhan and Mookher-
jee 2005) This argument is best demonstrated by looking at the impact of school district
revenue sources. When school districts source a higher percentage of their revenue lo-
cally, they are beholden to the interests of the local revenue base. Decentralization in this
case would increase income-based achievement gap. Thus, revenue diversification studied
from the perspective of public organizations must account for the political realities within
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which they operate. Like all organizations, public organizations may want to maximize
their revenue base. But when we factor in their unique organizational context, we see that
their financing choices have major impact on their key organizational outcomes.
1.3 Data and Methodology
The scientific study of organizations is incomplete without rich and reliable data.
Chapters two and four are empirical in nature and use data from publicly available on-
line database of the Texas Education Agency (TEA). I use almost two decades worth of
panel data of over thousand Texas public school districts, which are independent local
governments. Even though some data points are lost due to missing values and model
adjustments, I still have a large sample. Texas contains 8 percent of all US school districts
(Meier and O’Toole 2011). These independent local governments are highly professional-
ized organizations with their own taxing power, and are diverse entities that encompass ur-
ban to rural, rich to poor, and homogeneous to heterogeneous districts (Meier and O’Toole
2011). Majority of their revenue comes from the state and from local sales and prop-
erty tax. These school districts often face major funding shocks, have clear performance
measures, and demonstrate variation in the levels of slack reserves, decentralization, and
revenue generated through local sources, and have a variety of financial and administrative
indicators.
In chapter two, all reported models were estimated using ordinary least squares
regression. Pooled diagnostic tests were performed to address common concerns regard-
ing violations of key assumptions of classical linear regression. Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg tests showed traces of heteroscedasticity in estimated models. Thus, all mod-
els are report with robust standard errors clustered by the school districts. In addition,
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Drukker et al. 2003) shows presence of
serial correlation (Drukker et al. 2003). Thus, equations were adjusted with individual year
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dummies. Incorporation of year fixed effects give us within year variation in these models.
In chapter four, I estimate the district level production functions that give us the gross effect
of the educational output of interest (Brewer 1996). To allay usual concerns with times-
series data, a Fisher-type unit root test was conducted to check for stationarity and none
was found in the variables included. Preliminary analysis, using ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression, show violations of some classical linear regression assumptions and
the models were modified accordingly. Traces of heteroscedasticity were revealed by the
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. Like in chapter two, all OLS models were reported
with robust standard errors clustered by individual school districts. Again, Wooldridge
test for autocorrelation in panel data revealed serial correlation in the models (Drukker
et al. 2003). Therefore, as in chapter two, all models were estimated with individual year
dummies. Educational outcomes are autoregressive. Hence, performance on standardized
tests in year t does not usually change dramatically from year t − 1. Therefore, models
are reported with and without lagged dependent variables. For additional support of the
theory, models in chapter four are estimated using Autoregressive Random Effects (AR
r.e.) modeling strategy and reported, with year fixed effects and district random effects.
1.4 Conclusion
This dissertation sets out to demonstrate that organizational context matters in the
study of financial management through three distinct essays. Each essay deals with a sep-
arate organizational issue: revenue sourcing choice, risk taking, and environmental buffer-
ing. Each of these topics draws in one way or another from the for-profit management and
finance literature. The argument here is not that be must disregard the rich and vast body
of research dedicated to the study of money management in for-profit firms. Instead, there
is a clear need to investigate standard topics of financial management through the prism
of public and nonprofit firms. In addition, there are issues unique to public and nonprofit
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organizations that needs special attention, such as fund raising and financing of marketing
in nonprofit firms.
In this regard, the body of work on public financial management has made greater
strides than the body of research on nonprofit financial management. Public financial
management scholars have investigated a variety of topics related to running the finances
effectively and efficiently in public organizations, such as “governmental accounting and
auditing, debt policy and management, revenue forecasting, tax administration, public
procurement,” and so forth (Kioko et al. 2011, i113). Specialized topical expertise have
evolved, such as education finance and municipal finance. But this body of research has
faced a two-fold challenge. First, there is limited cross-pollination of ideas among vari-
ous specializations and sub-fields. Second, this body of work has paid little attention to
the “political, organizational, and institutional contexts,” within which all of these money
management issues mushroom (Kioko et al. 2011, i113). Again, as is the key argument
here, it is the political, organizational, and institutional contexts of public and nonprofit
organizations, that makes, say revenue forecasting, look different in for-profit versus pub-
lic or nonprofit firms. It is not enough for us to understand how the technical details of
financial management may be different in public and nonprofit organizations from their
for-profit counterparts. A better approach is to think theoretically, while addressing tech-
nical issues faced by public managers across sectors.
Besides demonstrating the importance of organizational context in financial man-
agement, the essays in this dissertation makes a concerted attempt to marry the “tech-
nocratic” dialect of public financial management with the theoretical approach of public
administration, which is deemed the new horizon in this line of work (Kioko et al. 2011).
The larger discipline can certainly benefit from inviting sub-fields, that have spoken past
each until now, to the same table and share valuable knowledge that they have garnered.
The essays here are an example of what research would look like if we were to consis-
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tently integrate technical questions that relate to money management, but study it keeping
the larger organizational context in mind that shapes the goals of organizations and the
incentives of actors within them.
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2. FISCAL SLACK, BUDGET SHOCKS, AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS
2.1 Introduction
The pool of resources required in an organization that is in excess of the mini-
mum needed to generate a specific level of output is slack (Hendrick 2006). Studies have
yielded mixed results on the usefulness of slack. Within the context of public organiza-
tions the public choice line of research argues that slack is synonymous with inefficiency
and budget-maximizing bureaucrats accumulate slack for personal gains. Management
scholars by and large take the opposite stand and argue that slack is an essential cushion
within an organization and serves a host of purposes, one of which is to buffer the or-
ganization from external turbulence. Empirical evidence on fiscal slack, especially as a
potential buffer against fiscal stress, in public finance has further added to this confusion,
suggesting it works sometimes and is useful to some extent. I argue that the key piece in
this puzzle is to classify slack into two categories: absorbed and unabsorbed slack. This
categorization has received limited attention, but can help us make sense of the inconsis-
tent results and evidences on slack thus far, specifically within public sector organizations.
In addition, while most studies have used various financial proxies as an outcome
of interest, a clearly defined performance measure that can be linked to fiscal slack has
been largely missing. School districts offer an excellent testing ground for such broader
issues in public administration (Raffle 2007). These are one of the most widespread local
governments in the US, have rich data, and clearly defined performance goals. Further-
more, these local governments constantly weather fiscal stress (Davis 2008; Trussel and
Patrick 2012). For instance, the 82nd Texas Legislature that convened in early 2011, faced
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a $7.8 billion shortfall in public education budget (Legislative Budget Board Fiscal Size
Up 2012-2013 Biennium). The loss of onetime federal funds, increased enrollment growth
in Texas schools, settle up costs in school districts, and declining values of local properties
in Texas caused this shortfall. Law makers opted to balance the budget primarily through
a $4 billion cut from public school funds, besides a $1.5 billion infusion from the General
Revenue Fund and $2.3 billion in deferred payments to school districts. Thus, over the
following biennium the state portion of public education funding was reduced by 6 per-
cent, with a 3.3 percent overall cut in the fiscal year 2011-2012. However, overall cuts,
primarily tied to enrollment, faced by some districts were as high as 8 to 9 percent.
An impact assessment shows that Texas school districts made a concerted effort to
prevent the 2011 funding shocks from affecting core instructional expenses and to protect
student learning (Goff and Robert 2013). Among the sampled schools, 31 percent dipped
into their fund balance in the 2011-2012 fiscal year (Goff and Robert 2013). While the
amount varied, many expressed concerns about the unsustainability of depleting these re-
serves to cover funding shortfalls. Districts reported that their top three cost containment
measures were in non-instructional categories. Specifically, districts deferred technolog-
ical upgrades, deferred maintenance, and froze administrative salaries, to protect instruc-
tional expenses (Goff and Robert 2013). As these local governments run leaner operations
during times of fiscal stress, the question arises if built in fiscal slack is these organizations
can successfully buffer the detrimental effects of negative funding shocks on their key de-
liverable: student performance.
I ask if public school districts, when faced with externally imposed funding cut-
backs, can mobilize internal fiscal slack to buffer student performance. This addresses
the broader question about the efficacy of fiscal slack resources as a buffering tool against
environmental turbulence in public organizations that deliver key public services, such as
education, healthcare, and public safety. As we know, these organizations in the US and
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around the world in recent years have been forced to cut costs and trim down. With pres-
sures to become more efficient, the question arises if they are getting leaner at the expense
of declining performance. Using a sample of over 1000 public school districts in Texas
from 1994 to 2010 I show that the distinction between absorbed and unabsorbed fiscal
slack is important when we discuss slack as a potential buffer. Fiscal slack alone cannot
entirely balance the negative impact of environmental turbulence on performance, specifi-
cally when there is a negative 10 percent or greater budget shock. However, districts with
higher thresholds of unabsorbed slack, with around 31.53 percent fund balance, can reduce
the negative impact of these shocks more effectively than districts with minimum, of just
0.05 percent, fund balance. This is opposite in the case of absorbed slack. These finding
help clarify the mixed results that have inundated this line of research.
2.2 Slack
According to economic theory organizational slack should equal zero (Cyert and
March 1963). But complete elimination of slack can only happen if an organization is able
to leverage its internal and external environment to fully optimize its resources (Bourgeois
1981), which is both risky and improbable. Additionally, slack is often considered an
inadvertent and inevitable outcome of group bargaining and decision making process in
any organization (Cyert and March 1963). Too much slack is undesirable, is equated with
inefficiency, and is considered a cause of organizational decline (Bourgeois 1981). Thus,
public managers face constant pressure to minimize or give up slack resources, or risk
their organizations being stigmatized as wasteful (Boyne and Walker 2004; Stanbury and
Thompson 1995; Salge 2011).
There is a rich literature that specifically explores slack in public organizations
(Busch 2002; Busch and Gustafsson 2002, see). The inherent suspicion of the utility and
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accumulation of slack in public organizations has a long tradition of support in the public
choice canon (Niskanen 1974; Moe 1997; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, see). The argument
is based on the concept of budget maximizing bureaucrats, as developed by Niskanen
(1974). These budget maximizing bureaucrats are expected to value slack in their orga-
nizations “for political gain and can accumulate it when they possess more information
about production costs relative to superiors, or when bureaucratic autonomy over bud-
getary matters is relatively high.” (Hendrick 2006, 16) This suspicion is further buttressed
by studies on local government finances that demonstrate that slack in municipal govern-
ments often far exceeds recommended amounts (Gianakis and Snow 2007; Stewart 2009;
Marlowe 2005; Gore 2009). There is no evidence to make a case for large slack reserves
as a key contributor to performance in these local governments (Marlowe 2011).
However, the general consensus among organization theorists is that the benefits
of organizational slack far outweigh its costs. Slack offers inducement to members of an
organization to remain in the organizational coalition, it works as a resource for conflict
resolution, it facilitates strategic behavior in an organization, it allows organizational risk
taking and innovation, and it works as a buffer against environmental turbulence (Cyert
and March 1963; Thompson 1967; Sharfman et al. 1988). As an organizational buffer,
slack resources have been linked to credit quality maintenance in municipal governments
(Marlowe 2011). Slack fiscal resources, specifically different fund balance categories,
have been demonstrated to have important stabilization effects on current expenditures
for municipalities, especially at the margins (Marlowe 2005). In the case of independent
school districts, one of the most widespread local governments in the US, fiscal slack has
been regarded as a key predictor in the analysis of financial stress, measured by decline in
instructional spending (Trussel and Patrick 2012).
The public finance literature has spent considerable effort in assessing various as-
pects of slack, such as the optimal amount (Marlowe 2011), its purpose in local govern-
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ments (Hendrick 2006), and its counter-cyclical stabilization effects on key expenditure
variables. Various financial indicators and bond ratings have been used in majority of
these studies as the outcomes of interest, often as proxies for performance. But they do
not tell us how slack may impact the key deliverables for these organization. For instance,
downgrading in bond ratings of a school district, a proxy for failure in public service de-
livery, offers only a partial picture of decline in performance. This is because bonds are
usually insured against the risk of downgrade (Trussel and Patrick 2012; Denison 2003;
Greenwald 2010; Nanda and Singh 2004). The present study attempts to fill this lacuna by
directly linking slack to key performance indicator in K-12 educational setting.
2.3 Theory and Hypotheses
The vast literature on slack has generated conflicting results and expectations. Or-
ganization theorists argue that slack is an indispensable organizational resource and will
positively contribute to performance. While public choice theorists argue that budget max-
imizing bureaucrats store slack for personal gains. The mixed results in local government
finance has only exacerbate this confusion. I argue that the missing link is a distinction
between two types of slack. Slack can exist in an organization in the form of absorbed
and unabsorbed resources (Tan and Peng 2003; Su, Xie, and Li 2009). Unabsorbed slack
shows up as uncommitted resources, while absorbed slack is tied to current operations and
is often hard to redeploy effectively. Tan and Peng (2003) demonstrate that in private orga-
nizations unabsorbed slack by and large has a positive association with performance, and
absorbed slack just the opposite. I extend this distinction to slack in public organizations.
Unabsorbed slack, such as various fund balances, are usually accumulated in a sep-
arate designated accounts that are closely monitored by senior management and external
auditors. These highly visible slack resources in local governments may also trigger pub-
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lic scrutiny in the form of “political pressure for tax cuts and spending increases” (Rose
and Smith 2011, 187). Furthermore, given the red tapes involved with accumulating and
spending these resources, public managers have to jump hoops before they can use these
resources. However, unabsorbed fiscal slack is also easy to redeploy. Mangers often have
more discretion over its usage since they are not tied to a specific purpose or spending cat-
egories, though this discretion comes at a price. For instance, Marlowe (2011, 93) shows
that with “some” unabsorbed fiscal slack, as opposed none, US local governments have a
5 to 9 percent improvement in credit ratings- a key performance indicator. This leads to
my first hypothesis,
H1 : Unabsorbed fiscal slack will positively impact overall student performance in public
school districts.
This is not the case for absorbed fiscal slack. Since these are tied to current op-
erations, absorbed fiscal slack is harder to observe and also redeploy. These often appear
in discretionary spending categories, such as non-instructional expenses in public schools.
Some scholars have argued that non-instructional spending, tied to current operations, is
often excessive and is negatively linked to performance (see, Brewer 1996). The limited
visibility of these absorbed slack resources also make them less open to public and man-
agerial scrutiny. If bureaucrats are budget maximizers, then they would be inclined to build
excessive absorbed slack in these less-visible categories. Alternatively, if public managers
are not budget maximizers, they still have an incentive to build in absorbed slack. For
example, they can have two employees to do the job of one, which is not counter-intuitive
given phrases such as lazy bureaucrats that pervades public and academic discourse (see,
Walsh 2011, 2012). In either cases absorbed slack then can be linked to inefficiencies in
public organizations, which in turn will hurt performance. Therefore,
H2 : Absorbed fiscal slack will negatively impact overall student performance in public
school districts.
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Few studies have looked at the interactive effect of funding shocks and slack on ag-
gregate performance in public organizations. Those that have argue that public schools can
overcome the negative impact of a single major budget shock. Specifically, public schools
with 10 percent or greater budget shock can activate “(partial) slack in the managerial
resources” in the short run and buffer performance from budget shocks (O’Toole Jr and
Meier 2010, 345). This partial slack, measured by the percentage of school district central
office administrators, interacts with substantial budget shocks and dissipates the impact of
these shocks on student performance. I argue that the distinction between absorbed and
unabsorbed slack is crucial in the assessment of fiscal slack as an effective buffer.
Since mangers have more discretion over unabsorbed fiscal slack, during times of
crisis they can quickly redeploy these resources. As we see in the introductory case of
Texas schools post 2011 funding cuts, several districts dipped into their fund balances.
This was possible because during such crisis public scrutiny, red tape, and regulatory bot-
tlenecks restricting the usage of these funds in Texas were quickly relaxed, and the core
goal of salvaging student performance took center stage (Goff and Robert 2013). This
leads to my next hypothesis,
H3 : Unabsorbed fiscal slack will be successful in buffering the impact of a single major
negative budget shock on performance in public school districts.
In case of absorbed slack, I argue the opposite. If public managers are budget
maximizers, they will not accumulate slack into the operation of the organization that will
serve any purpose, besides their own. Post-2011 Texas funding cuts the majority of school
districts curtailed their spending on non-instructional categories, one of which was admin-
istrative overheads (Goff and Robert 2013). In these districts a hierarchical administrative
system controls the flow of resources and coordinates key activities (Brewer 1996). When
districts freeze spending on these categories in the aftermath of funding cutbacks, they
do two things. First, districts demonstrate inherent inefficiencies in allocations of these
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resources. Second, they put an additional jolt to their organizational operations, which
is already suffering from a budget shock. Ideally, districts would smoothly transition to
a more optimal usage of these and other non-instructional resources. In sum, absorbed
slack tied to current operations will be an ineffective buffering against performance drops
after negative funding shocks. Organizations with more absorbed slack may have a harder
time coping with such shocks, because either they are more sluggish or they put additional
stress on their organizations by attempting to reallocate resources as a crisis management
measure. This leads to my final hypothesis,
H4 : Absorbed fiscal slack will be unsuccessful in buffering the impact of a single major
negative budget shock on performance in public school districts.
2.4 Model and Data
A variation of the OToole and Meier organizational performance model is used
here (Meier and O’Toole 2009, for an overview see). Briefly stated, the model suggests:
Per f ormanceit = f (Slackit +BudgetShockit +Slackit ∗BudgeShockit +Controls) (2.1)
Where “Performance” is any organizational performance metric, “Slack” is any measure
of financial slack within public organizations, and “Shock” is a negative budget shock. Fis-
cal slack interacts with downward budget shocks and the expectation is that slack would be
able to cushion the overall negative impact of budget shocks on the performance indicator.
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2.5 Variables
2.5.1 Slack
Slack is the key predictor and conditional factor in the proposed interactive theory.
I argue that two separate forms of fiscal slack have dissimilar effects as a performance
buffer.
Unabsorbed slack is measured by the amount of surplus fund balance expressed as
a percent of the total budgeted expenditures (for the general fund) for the current year in a
school district. As the financial guidelines of districts clearly state, fund balances are not
rainy day funds. Instead, these are unreserved, undesignated surplus fund balance from
the end of the previous school year. In most districts, this amount is equivalent to the fund
balance at the beginning of the current school year. There has been an increasing tendency
by districts to use these funds to meet shortages caused by budget cuts (Goff and Robert
2013). Besides the theoretical importance of the fund balance expressed as a percent of
the total budgeted expenditures, it is also recently targeted by popular commentators as an
unused resource for school districts and as a justification for funding cuts during economic
downturns.
Absorbed financial slack is measured with non-instructional dollars scaled by en-
rollment in a school district. This expenditure category covers expenses for administrative
support, instructional support, and non-academic programs (Trussel and Patrick 2012).
Thus, relative to total expenditures, the monies spent on non-instructional functions are
discretionary (Tuckman and Chang 1991).
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2.5.2 Performance
The dependent variable is the percentage of students in a district who passed all
(reading, writing and math) sections of the TAAS or TAKS. Texas school districts admin-
istered Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) from 2003 -2010 and Texas
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) from 1993-2002 as the key performance measure.
TAAS was replaced by TAKS in 2003. These are both standardized criterion-based tests
that are required of all students in grades 3 through 8, and grade 11. In addition, TAKS
required students in 9th and 10th grade to take the test. While the two exams are slightly
different, for the purposes of the present analysis they offer a good consistent measure for
a standardized performance metric over time. This is a key metric that managers at various
levels of the Texas school system care about and policy makers pay attention to.
2.5.3 Budget Shock
To measure budget shocks I first regress total school district revenues per pupil
(logged) in the present year on the previous years school district revenue per pupil (logged)
and consumer price index values. This captures what the revenues of school districts,
scaled by enrollment, would be if past trends continued, while also accounting for in-
flation. Any year-to-year reductions in school district budgets that exceed 10 percent of
revenues are designated as a negative shock dummy (coded 1 for a shock). A 10 percent
or more decrease in year to year school district revenue is a big loss school districts and
close to the amount lost by some Texas school districts in 2011 (Meier and O’Toole 2009;
O’Toole Jr and Meier 2010). Furthermore, the shock equation also takes into account en-
rollment trends. Revenue growth that is disproportionate with respect to enrollment helps
us get at unanticipated dimension of these budgetary shocks. And since the model already
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controls for various expenditures, the coefficients of the shock variable estimate the impact
of the shock, given the controls.
The 10 percent shock threshold is a solid, but nevertheless an arbitrary benchmark
for a major downward budget shock. It is hard to tell if a 9.5 percent or a 10.5 percent shock
threshold will cause meaningful differences in the key findings. However, there is some
precedence of using the 10 percent threshold as a major budget shock in public school
districts (Meier and O’Toole 2009; O’Toole Jr and Meier 2010), which is the key reason
for using this threshold here. Besides the 10 percent threshold, analyses were conducted
with downward shocks of 5, 15, and 18 percent. There were no statistically significant
findings for 5 percent and 18 percent categories in any of the models presented below.
This is perhaps because 5 percent shocks were too common and not powerful enough to
perturb district performance outcomes and 18 percent shocks were rare and impacted only
a minority of the cases. An alternative to this binary shock measure, is a continuous rev-
enue volatility measure that is also considered. The residuals from the growth model used
to estimate the 10 percent budget shock, is used as to capture revenue volatility. But this
predictor does not yield any meaningful results in the subsequent models, and is therefore
not pursued further.
2.5.4 Controls
The vast literature on education production function offers some additional factors
that may impact standardized test performance (Todd and Wolpin 2003, for an overview
see). A higher percentages of African American, Hispanic, and low-income students in a
school district is expected to negatively impact TAAS/TAKS passing rate students. Higher
average teacher salary (in 1,000 dollars), higher per student instructional spending (in
1,000 dollars), and lower class size (number of students per teacher) should all positively
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contribute to TAAS/TAKS passing rate. Students in districts with more experienced teach-
ers and lower percentage of non-certified teachers are also expected to fare better on stan-
dardized tests. Furthermore, wealthier districts with higher property value per pupil should
also fare better than poorer districts on standardized exams. The logged value of standard-
ized total (post exemptions) of the tax property value of a school district per pupil is used.
There is some debate on the impact of location on test performance (Butters, Asarta, and
Thompson 2013). However, there is evidence of significant variation in achievement based
on location. Thus, all models includes rural and metropolitan dummies, using micropoli-
tan as the base category. Logged enrollment is included as a measure of district size, which
is expected to negatively impact performance. Finally, while this study focuses on nega-
tive budget shocks, positive shocks can counterbalance the negative impact of a downward
shock. Thus, key models (with the negative shock dummies) also include a 10 percent or
greater positive shock (extracted from the residuals) of the aforementioned shock equa-
tion. Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics for all variables.
2.6 Findings
Does unabsorbed fiscal slack resources have a positive impact on performance? As
we see in Table 2.2, the coefficient of percent fund balance is in the expected direction,
though the impact is not major.1 On average, this unabsorbed slack measure contributes to
approximately .03 percentage point improvement in TAAS/TAKS passing rate, holding all
other variables constant. Thus, unabsorbed fiscal slack has a minor, but positive, impact
on overall student performance in school districts and I find limited support for H1. The
1In Table 2.2, Table 2.3, and Table 2.4 robust standard errors clustered by districts are reported in paren-
thesis. A two-tailed tests of significance is used where * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001. Also, in
these tables, the controls and year dummies are not reported. In Table 2.3 non-instructional expenses per
pupil is not reported. In Table 2.4 fund balance is not reported.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for slack, shock, and test performance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All student TAAS/TAKS passing rate 72.67 13.13 14 100
Year end fund balance (percent) 25.47 18.98 -41.2 185
Non-instructional expenses per pupil (000s) 3.96 2.80 0.79 26.98
Instructional expenses per pupil (000s) 3.76 1.09 0.88 15.84
Average teacher experience (years) 12.03 2.34 0 28.4
Non-certified teachers (percentage) 2.47 4.52 0 93.33
Student teacher ratio 12.73 2.47 3.3 57.40
Average teacher salary (’000s) 35.68 5.84 19.59 72.39
African american student (percent) 8.11 12.02 0 87
Hispanic student (percent) 29.83 26.95 0 100
Low-income student (percent) 49.75 19.22 0 100
Log enrollment 6.99 1.50 2.56 12.26
Log tax property value per pupil 12.18 0.76 9.19 15.05
0 1
Negative 10% + budget shock 15803 1085
Positive 10% + budget shock 13948 2940
Metropolitan 8990 7898
Micropolitan* 13870 3018
Rural 10916 5972
Note: *Base, excluded from models
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Table 2.2: Fiscal slack, budget shock and performance
DV: Overall TAAS/TAKS exam pass (percent)
Year end fund balance (percent) 0.026**
(0.01)
Non-instructional expenses per pupil (’000s) 0.066
(0.07)
Negative budget shock -0.694*
(0.28)
Lagged negative budget shock -0.612*
(0.28)
constant 53.184***
(4.57)
R-Squared 0.635
N 17049
coefficients of the absorbed slack measure is also positive, contrary to what was hypothe-
sized. However, the impact is not statistically significant at the standard thresholds. Thus,
we cannot arrive at a conclusion about H2. A ten percent or greater negative budget shock
in the current year and the past year causes a little over one-half point decline in perfor-
mance. The impact of shock in the past year on performance, is slightly weaker than that
in the current year.
As we see in Table 2.2, most of the controls impact the outcome variable in
the expected direction. An anomalous finding, besides the negative but statistically non-
significant finding for instructional expenses, is that of the impact of a 10 percent or greater
positive budget shock on performance. One would expect that a positive shock would
impact performance favorably. However, the negative coefficients of the positive shock
variable in all the subsequent models (Table 2.3 and Table 2.4) tell a different story. These
results suggest that budgetary stability is positively linked with performance in public or-
ganizations. Shock variables (both negative and positive) pick up the instability component
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Table 2.3: Can unabsorbed slack buffer a major budget shock?
DV: All student standardized test pass rate (percent)
Year end fund balance (percent) 0.021*
(0.01)
Negative budget shock -1.716***
(0.45)
Lagged negative budget shock -1.255**
(0.43)
Fund balance*Negative budget shock 0.034**
(0.01)
Fund balance*Lagged negative budget shock 0.024
(0.01)
constant 53.551***
(4.57)
R-Squared 0.635
N 16888
that is detrimental to, and thus negatively associated with, performance on standardized
tests. Since this is not the focus of this paper, I do not pursue this further here. Next, I ad-
dress the first of the two key questions in this study: when a 10 percent or greater negative
budget shock hits school districts in the current year, can unabsorbed fiscal slack resources
in Texas school districts buffer aggregate student passing rate on TAAS/TAKS?
Table 2.3 shows with no impact of unabsorbed slack and holding all other vari-
ables constant, a negative budget shock in the current year and past year can cause over a
percentage point drop in test passing rate. The coefficient of the interaction terms are also
statistically significant and in the expected positive direction. To understand the interac-
tive effect of negative budget shock and unabsorbed fiscal slack better, Table 2.3 is used to
generate a marginal plot.2
2Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3, and Figure 2.4 were created using the strategy laid out by Berry,
Golder, and Milton (2012).
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The vertical axis on the left of Figure 2.1 gives us the marginal impact of a neg-
Figure 2.1: Marginal effect of 10%+ budget shock(t) on performance at various levels of
unabsorbed slack
ative 10 percent or greater budget shock in the current year on performance at various
levels of the modifying variable. The vertical axis on the right gives us the percentage
of observations. The horizontal axis in Figure 2.1 captures the entire range of the mod-
ifying variable, percent year-end fund balance, in the sample. The values range from a
negative 41.2 percent of fund balance reserves expressed as a percent of the total budgeted
expenditures for the current year to a surplus fund balance of 185 percent. However, as the
overlaid histograms show us, majority of school districts in the sample have fund balance
ranging from a 0.05 percent to about 60 percent. Furthermore, for the purposes of the
interactive theory, the range within which the moderating effect of fund balance is statis-
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tically significant is between 0.05 percent and 33.95 percent. This also happens to be the
range within which we have the bulk of districts, as evidenced by the histogram, and thus
is of substantive importance.
It is clear that throughout this effective range the impact of a 10 percent or greater
budget shock continues to be negative on TAAS/TAKS pass rate. Meaning unabsorbed
slack, as measured by percent year-end fund balance, cannot turn the negative impact of
a budget shock into positive impact. Funding cuts impact performance no matter what,
unless districts have surplus fund balance that is over 128 percent of projected expenses.
These districts are an anomaly and can be disregarded for general theory building pur-
poses. As we move from districts that have a 0.05 percent fund balance to those that have
close to a little over 33 percent fund balance, the negative impact of the downward shock
reduces. For instance, at 0.05 percent fund balance, on average budget shocks drop stan-
dardized test pass rate by 1.71 percent points. At 25.47 percent, or mean fund balance,
this downward impact reduces to a drop of .86 percentage points. Finally, at 33.95 percent
of fund balance the negative impact of budget shock on student passing rate drops to .57
percent points. A similar analysis is carried out with a lagged downward budget shock.
Figure 2.2 varies from Figure 2.1 in that it plots the interaction of the lagged
budget shock with percent fund balance from Table 2.3. It shows that as unabsorbed
slack reserves increase in a district the negative impact of lagged downward budget shock
on performance is reduced, as in the previous case. At 0.05 performance drops by 1.25
points, which reduces to a 0.57 point drop at a 29.1 percent fund balance level. The im-
provements in performance, as seen in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, are minimal. However,
these findings validate the argument that districts with more unabsorbed slack can buffer
some of the negative impact of budget shocks on their core performance goals (H3). How
about absorbed slack?
I argue that absorbed slack is ineffective in buffering a negative budget shock
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Figure 2.2: Marginal effect of 10%+ budget shock(t-1) on performance at various levels
of unabsorbed slack
Table 2.4: Can absorbed slack buffer a major budget shock?
DV: All student standardized test pass rate (percent)
Non-instructional expenses per pupil (000s) 0.069
(0.07)
Negative budget shock -0.575
(0.52)
Lagged negative budget shock -0.529
(0.60)
Non-instructional expenses*Negative budget shock -0.028
(0.11)
Non-instructional expenses*Lagged negative budget shock -0.020
(0.14)
constant 53.551***
(4.57)
R-Squared 0.635
N 16888
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(H4.) The interaction terms, between shock and non-instruction expenditures and lagged
shock and non-instruction expenditures in Table 2.4 suggests that is indeed the case. While
these models do not produce statistically significant results, it is still useful to look at the
marginal plots.
Figure 2.3: Marginal effect of 10%+ budget shock(t) on performance at various levels of
absorbed slack
The interaction between the absorbed slack measure and a negative budget shock
from Table 2.4 is captured in Figure 2.3. The interaction between the absorbed slack mea-
sure and a lagged negative budget shock from Table 2.4 is captured in Figure 2.4. A sta-
tistically and substantively significant range of impact of the non-instruction expenditures
emerges in both the figures. In Figure 2.4, this range is between districts that spend $2,500
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Figure 2.4: Marginal effect of 10%+ budget shock(t-1) on performance at various levels
of absorbed slack
dollars on non-instructional expenses per pupil to those that spend $6,520. In Figure 2.4
this range is between districts that spend $2,940 dollars on non-instructional expenses per
pupil to those that spend $4,940. In both the cases, we can see that when a negative budget
shock hits, in the current year or past year, with increasing amounts of non-instructional
spending overall standardized test passing rate drops. For instance, in Figure 3 at $2,500
dollars on non-instructional expenses, the average passing rate is reduced by .64 point
when a negative shock hits. At $6,520 non-instructional expenses the average passing rate
reduction bumps up to .76. While this change is minor, the detrimental impact of absorbed
slack is evident (H4).
A series of additional sensitivity analysis were performed. First, all models were
split into rural and urban districts. The findings remain largely unaltered for urban dis-
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tricts, but were washed way for rural districts. I attribute this to the high concentration of
urban school districts in the sample. Second, there were no statistically significant find-
ings to suggest that the two slack measures selected in this study, when squared, had a
non-linear impact on TAAS/TAKS passing rate. Also, at 15 percent shock thresholds the
findings for the unabsorbed fiscal slack measure remain largely unchanged, suggesting
that as fund balance reserves increased districts were better able to cushion negative 15
percent or greater budget shocks. There were no statistically significant findings for ab-
sorbed slack measure after altering the budget shock threshold.
2.7 Conclusion
I argue that each type of slack will have dissimilar buffering potency. But if by
buffering we mean fiscal slack variables when interacted with shock will turn the negative
coefficients positive, we do not see that here. As the introductory case suggested, districts
can rarely work in an environment of turbulence, in this case withstand funding shocks,
and not have their performance impacted. These findings suggest that the distinction be-
tween absorbed and unabsorbed fiscal slack in public organizations in general and as an
organizational buffer in particular is still important. I show that districts with higher un-
absorbed slack, measured by percent fund balance, will be able to cushion the negative
impact of a downward funding shock, better than those that do not have adequate unab-
sorbed slack built in. Districts with higher thresholds of unabsorbed slack, with around
31.53 percent fund balance, can reduce the negative impact of these shocks more effec-
tively than districts with minimum, of just 0.05 percent, fund balance. This is opposite
in the case of absorbed slack. These finding resolve to some extent the mixed results that
have inundated research on slack as a buffer.
What is the general make up of districts that fall within the minimum 0.05 percent
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and below 31.53 percent range? There are 12,345 or around 73 percent of cases (district,
years) within this range in the overall sample. Around 30 percent of these districts were
rural and on an average enrolled approximately 5,200 students. These districts catered to
on average 9 percent African American, 30 percent Hispanic, and 49 percent low-income
students. About 6 percent (670 cases) of these 12,345 cases faced a negative 10 percent
or greater budget shock. As we saw earlier, districts most successful in buffering funding
shocks had between the 25.47 percent (mean) and 31.53 percent range of fund balance.
There are about 2,130 (of the 12,345 cases), or about 17 percent, cases within this higher
fund balance range. Of these 2,130 cases around 7 percent (155 cases) faced a 10 percent
or greater negative budget shock. This means that majority of the 670 negative budget
shocks, or around 77 percent, were faced by districts that had fund balance below the
mean, and just above the minimum 0.05 percent threshold. These were also districts that
enroll on average around 5,800 students. While districts with fund balance above the mean
and below 31.53 point threshold, had only around 2,800 average enrollment. Thus, dis-
tricts with below average unabsorbed slack and a greater share of students were the ones
hit with most number of negative funding shocks. Thus, districts that could benefit from
more unabsorbed slack did not have enough of it.
In the case of absorbed slack, on average the range within which we have statis-
tically and substantively significant findings across the current and past year shocks is
from a minimum of $2,730 to a maximum of $5,730 per pupil non-instructional alloca-
tions. There are around 9,370 cases (district, years) or a little below 56 percent of overall
cases in this range. Around 38 percent of these districts were rural and on an average en-
rolled approximately 3,000 students. On average, these districts enrolled around 8 percent
African American, 32 percent Hispanic, and 52 percent low-income students. Approxi-
mately 7 percent (644 cases) of these cases faced a negative 10 percent or greater budget
shock. We saw earlier that the lower the amount of absorbed slack in a district the better
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its chances of cushioning the negative impact of a downward budget shock. Then what is
the percentage of downward shocks faced by districts that have non-instructional spend-
ing below the mean value of $3,960, but above $2,730? There were 379 negative budget
shocks in these districts, thus making up for 59 percent of the 644 budget shocks. The
remaining 41 percent of downward major budget shocks were tackled by districts with a
higher non-instructional spending per pupil (between $3,960 and $5,730). Thus, there is a
clear need for concerted, and not post crisis, efforts in finding allocative efficiencies within
these latter districts such that they can use their absorbed slack resources better.
Meier and O’Toole (2009) observe that in the short run since public managers can
often handle environmental shocks, such as major budget shocks, they may motivate po-
litical interest and leadership to put more stress on these organizations. There might be
less incentive for budget recovery initiatives if managers can reallocate resources to cush-
ion funding shocks from hurting performance. The present study demonstrates that in the
long run public managers cannot cushion their organizations from a drop in performance
when hit by funding shocks. In addition, the most vulnerable school districts do not have
adequate slack resources that can actually help in cushioning downward funding shocks.
The slack they have tied to operations is not helpful in counterbalancing shocks.
While these findings are within the context of public schools, they have clear im-
plication for public organizations in general. Public organizations must think carefully
about what types of slack resources they must store. Clearly the more visible and highly
scrutinized unabsorbed slack is a better buffer. Therefore, public managers need to find
ways to legitimize storing these resources in their organizations. Perhaps a part of the task
is to educate higher authorities, political interests, and clients about the benefits of these
resources. Future research can build upon various unexplored aspects of this study, such
as the impact of various alternative measures of absorbed and unabsorbed fiscal slack in
schools and other public organizations, possible impact of repeated shocks, and also alter-
33
native shock and outcome measures.
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3. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND RISK IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
Financial performance is a key predictor of organizational risk taking in for-profit
firms (Bromiley 1991; Singh 1986). As the nonprofit sector grows in importance, both
by virtue of its scale and services offered, it becomes important to understand if and how
this relationship might play out in nonprofit firms. After all, organizational risk taking is
tied to organizational innovation. Nonprofit firms fulfill myriad needs in todays society,
ranging from bringing art and music to a community, to “fighting homelessness, disease,
emergencies, disaster, and other community needs” (McDonald 2007, 258). Stagnation
in the nonprofit sector would mean that an important societal need might go unfulfilled
or unattended. Thus, we would want nonprofits to innovate and take risks, just like for-
profits. But the incentives of profit and wealth accumulation that underlie various theoret-
ical models of risk and performance in for-profit firms, is not be helpful for understanding
nonprofit behavior. According to Helmig, Ingerfurth, and Pinz (2014), the notion of or-
ganizational failure as understood in the for-profit context may not transfer seamlessly to
nonprofits. The authors argue that “poor financial performance and resource scarcity” may
not necessarily reflect organizational failure in nonprofits, instead the “degree of mission
accomplishment” should be a better benchmark for failure in such organizations (Helmig,
Ingerfurth, and Pinz 2014, 1513).
Nonprofits are expected to be motivated by mission or a societal need, instead of
the bottom line. But nonprofits that fail to acquire financial resources to run operations,
pay employees and creditors, save for a rainy day, and continue business will also fail to
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fulfill their organizational objectives and cease operations (Helmig, Ingerfurth, and Pinz
2014). This study proposes that the expectation of better financial performance leading to
lower risk taking in for-profits, will be essentially reversed in nonprofits. As a nonprofit
firm becomes more fiscally secure, we should expect it to take more risks to serve an ex-
panded constituency or add to its extant mission goals. In the following sections, this idea
is developed through a discussion of the relevant literature, followed by an exposition of
the proposed theory. A set of hypotheses from these arguments is derived and a testable
model is proposed, before closing remarks.
3.2 Literature
This section introduces the relevant literature on financial performance and risk
taking in nonprofit organizations.
3.2.1 Financial Performance
Nonprofits manage finances to meet mission objectives (Hackler and Saxton 2007;
Sontag-Padilla, Staplefoote, and Gonzalez Morganti 2012). To attract funds in a com-
petitive donor marketplace, nonprofits must demonstrate accountability, performance, ef-
fectiveness, efficiency and “good financial stewardship” (Eckerd 2015, 438). Dolgoff and
Feldstein (2012) offer a nice discussion of donor contribution trends in US nonprofits in the
early 2000s. The authors note that in 2005 total contributions to US nonprofits was 260.3
billion dollars. Contributions had an upward swing and rose by fourteen percent since
2000. Only twenty seven percent of the 2005 contributions was from foundations and cor-
porations. The major chunk of 2005 figure was contributions from individual donors. On
average donors gave 36 percent to religious organizations, 15 percent to educational orga-
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nizations, 10 percent to human services, and 9 percent to health care organizations in that
period (Dolgoff and Feldstein 2012, 281-282). But the great recession heavily impacted
donor and government munificence. Mission is not the only priority for most nonprof-
its today. Due to reduction in government subsidies and donations over the years, good
financial performance has become an important standalone concern for nonprofits today
(Hager et al. 1996; Helmig, Spraul, and Tremp 2011; Helmig, Ingerfurth, and Pinz 2014).
Most nonprofits struggle to strike a balance between mission and financial sustainability
(Sontag-Padilla, Staplefoote, and Gonzalez Morganti 2012, vi), which is the foundation of
nonprofit financial performance.
Tuckman and Chang (1991) have done seminal work in the assessment of nonprofit
financial performance, focusing on ascertaining financial vulnerability. For Tuckman and
Chang (1991, 445), if a nonprofit cuts back services immediately after it experiences a
fiscal shock, it is financially vulnerable. They identified four indicators of such vulnerabil-
ity: inadequate equity balance, revenue concentration, low administrative costs, and low
operating margins. First, equity is the difference between nonprofit asset and liabilities
(Tuckman and Chang 1991, 451). A large equity base can allow a nonprofit to success-
fully buffer a downward revenue shock. Therefore, inadequate equity balance is a financial
red flag. Second, if a nonprofit has only a limited set of revenue sources, it suffers from
revenue concentration. As the number of revenue sources rises, a nonprofit has a better
chance of business continuity in case a few of those sources run out. Third, nonprofits
with high administrative cost may be able to sustain itself by cutting administrative costs
at times of fiscal austerity. Firms with already low costs will have little opportunity to add
cost savings. Building on the work of Tuckman and Chang (1991), Greenlee and Trussel
(2000, 203) adds another dimension of sophistication by suggesting that a financially vul-
nerable nonprofit is one that decreases its program service expenditures, scaled by total
revenue, in three consecutive years. Finally, Tuckman and Chang (1991) suggest looking
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at a firms operating margins, which is the difference between a nonprofits revenues and
expenditures divided by revenues. The larger this revenue surplus is, the more secure a
nonprofit will be during times of downward fiscal shocks.
In fact, some scholars argue that revenue surplus can offer competitive advantage
to any firm in todays competitive nonprofit marketplace (Bryson, Gibbons, and Shaye
2001; Weerawardena, McDonald, and Mort 2010; Helmig, Ingerfurth, and Pinz 2014).
But revenue surplus leads to wealth accumulation over time, which may prove to be a
double edged sword.1 As Calabrese (2011) notes, studies have demonstrated that nonprof-
its with excess cash and short-term investments, may face agency problems. Core, Guay,
and Verdi (2006, 307) demonstrate that nonprofits with large cash reserves “do not exhibit
higher growth in program expenses or investments,” which the authors attribute to agency
problem. Calabrese (2011) examines the influence of a firms accumulated wealth on in-
dividual charitable contributions. The author finds that for an average nonprofit, less than
two years worth of expenses may positively impact contributions, while excessive wealth
(defined as greater than five years of expenses) crowds out contributions (Calabrese 2011,
867). The author concludes that perhaps modest accumulated available wealth signals fi-
nancial health to current and prospective donors.
Measurement and analyses are subjected to reliable data. Over the years nonprof-
its have gotten better at making financial information available. In recent times, IRS 990
tax return forms filed by a majority of nonprofits is considered a prominent and reliable
source of financial data on these organizations (Froelich, Knoepfle, and Pollak 2000).
With increasing transparency, the consumers of nonprofit financial information has also
burgeoned. The primary consumer would be donors, who review various financial infor-
mation, and perhaps a few of the indicators of financial sustainability measures discussed
1Though, accumulated wealth is not always readily available for use in a nonprofit, since endowments of-
ten come with strings attached, such as various spending restrictions and pre-determined spending timelines
(Calabrese 2011).
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above, to make donative decisions (Calabrese 2011). The literature on this topic suggests
that more efficient nonprofits tend to attract donors. Efficiency is assessed in a variety of
ways, such as lower overhead costs, lower price of donation, and various administrative
ratios (for a discussion see, Calabrese 2011). The goal of the current paper is to determine
if these various financial benchmarks may help to predict the propensity of a nonprofit to
take more or less risk.
3.2.2 Organizational Risk-Taking
In standard classical decision theory, risk is the variation in “distribution of possible
outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjective values” (Shapira 1995, 22). Individuals
hazard a risky choice, despite significant likelihood of unfavorable outcome, if they value
the possible benefit of the favorable outcome enough to not be dissuaded by potential loss
(from the unfavorable outcome) (Chen and Bozeman 2012; Fischhoff, Watson, and Hope
1984). The nature of risk is context dependent (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). In other words,
strategic risks in an organization may manifest as “venturing into the unknown,” or “bor-
rowing heavily,” or “committing” a relatively large portion of assets” (Baird and Thomas
1985, 231-232). Previous studies of risk-return relations have defined risk as the unpre-
dictability of a firm’s income stream (for an overview, see Bromiley 1991). The focus of
the present study is organizational risk that is a combination of the first and last categories,
where in an organization commits a large portion of its resource to a new venture. For
nonprofits, this would translate to investing in a new mission or a new partnership.
The private sector has been the focus of majority of studies of organizational risk
taking. A small group of scholars have investigated risk taking attitudes among govern-
ment and private organizations (Chen and Bozeman 2012). The general consensus is that
nonprofits on an average are more inclined to take risks than their public counterparts,
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but both governments and nonprofits are more risk averse than for-profit firms (Chen and
Bozeman 2012).
Given the inherent possibility of unfavorable outcomes, is taking risk taking bad?
Organizations in general are risk-averse, and will take risk only when they foresee the
prospect of a high return (Singh 1986). As Chen and Bozeman (2012, 393) notes, “risk is
not a value to be pursued without limit.” Notwithstanding, organizations need to innovate
and change to adapt to the vicissitudes of internal and external environment. Innovation
is a key activity for any organization (McDonald 2007). Dynamic theories of competition
in the private sector, “point to the central role of innovation in the process of striving for
competitive advantage, which leads to superior financial performance.” (McDonald 2007,
258). As Lumpkin and Dess (1996, 142) points out, a firms innovativeness reflects its
propensity to support and adopt new ideas, depart from existing practices, and break from
the status quo. In other words, take risk.
Evidence from the for-profit literature has demonstrated that organizations need
to innovate to stay relevant, and to innovate they must take risk (Covin and Slevin 1998;
Miller 1983). In fact, risk taking is considered a path to achieving financial success in
for-profit firms. But the outcome of risk taking and change is always uncertain, with a
possibility of organizational decline or, in extreme cases, organizational demise.
Shapira (1995, 26) notes that classical decision theory has debunked two fallacies
in the body of work on risk-taking. First, that people are risk averse. They are not. Sec-
ond, that there is always a positive correlation between risk and return. Risk and return
correlation, which has been largely studied from the perspective of the behavior of actors
in financial markets, does not always hold up (Shapira 1995, 26). Risk, however calcu-
lated, does not guarantee positive returns. Also, we cannot generalize an individual’s risk
attitudes from one context to another (Shapira 1995). An actor who is risk averse in one
context may welcome some risk in another. But we know nothing about risk taking in
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nonprofit organizations.
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses
The specific question we wrestle with here is if increase in its financial performance
will induce a nonprofit to take more risk? Bromiley (1991) offers an excellent overview of
the vast body of research that has investigated the direct link between organizational per-
formance and corporate risk taking. Starting with the seminal work of Bowman (1982),
the focus of this line of research has been the private sector. For-profit organizations are,
as their name suggests, motivated by profit maximization (Helmig, Ingerfurth, and Pinz
2014). This body of work has largely used financial performance, as a proxy for the
broader concept of organizational performance, to develop theory and offer empirical evi-
dence for for-profit risk taking behavior.
Decline in financial performance is the key motivation for for-profit firms to in-
novate and take risks, so that they may reach, or exceed, pre-decline levels of financial
performance (Bromiley 1991; Singh 1986). Thus, there is a negative relationship between
financial performance and risk taking in for-profit organizations. Singh (1986, 565) argues
that the underlying factor in risk-performance relationship is the concept of “satisficing
levels of organizational performance,” that the author derives from the seminal work of
March and Simon (1958). When organizational performance falls below satisficing levels,
a for-profit firm would be highly likely to take risks and vice-versa (Singh 1986, 565).2
These claims have resonated elsewhere. Building on the work of Fisher and Hall (1969),
Bromiley (1991) argue that performance of for-profit firms negatively affect their propen-
sity to take risks. Indeed, when a firm is doing well, as reflected in strong financial stand-
2 Singh (1986) substantiates his argument with empirical support from a sample of 64 medium to large US
and Canadian corporations, which span several different industries such as airlines, railroads, pharmaceutical
manufacturers, mining, and so forth (Singh 1986, 571).
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ing, they see no reason to rock the proverbial boat. If for-profit firms do take risks in such
scenarios, they will do so only if compensated by possibility of high returns (Bromiley
1991, 42). Bowman (1982, 24) calls this the “risk-return paradox.”
Risk taking is context dependent (Shapira 1995, 25). The unique context of a non-
profit will impact the relationship between a firms financial performance and its risk taking
behavior. This is because, the foundation of this link is based on the incentives of actors in
firms, and in this regard nonprofits differ from their for-profit counterparts, and to a large
extent reflect those of public organizations. Nonprofits differ from for-profits organiza-
tions in three respect: vision, strategic constraint, and financial constraint (Hull and Lio
2006, 54). Like public organizations, nonprofits are not motivated by profit or bottom line.
Nonprofits are driven by mission (Hackler and Saxton 2007). These organizations are de-
pendent on external revenue sources, such as donors, grants, and in some cases revenue to
sustain themselves. As Hull and Lio (2006, 5) argues, non-profits “must” prioritize social
change over revenue or profit maximization.
Organizations vary in their overall level of risk aversion (Chen and Bozeman 2012,
380). Thus, we can expect variation in the affinity for risky choices and innovation across
nonprofit firms. Risk associated with innovation leads to competitive advantage in for-
profit firms, which may not look the same in nonprofits. Like for-profits, nonprofit orga-
nizations sometimes compete for customers and revenue (Chetkovich and Frumkin 2003).
But, as McDonald (2007) points out, competition for nonprofit organizations have a dif-
ferent meaning and, unlike for-profits, nonprofit financial sustainability is a means to meet
the goal of serving its mission and constituents.
Risk taking behavior of all firms, irrespective of their specialization or service fo-
cus, will be impacted by their financial standing. But the standard expectations about
financial performance and risk taking, as developed in the for-profit literature, will not
hold for nonprofits. In private sector firms, poor financial performance will push top man-
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agement to take risks to salvage the firm from demise. When balance sheet looks promis-
ing again, the firm will stop taking risks. Nonprofits are generally risk averse (Hull and
Lio 2006). Chen and Bozeman (2012) discusses the various similarities in the incentive
structures of public and nonprofit firms. Salge (2011) finds that in English public hospi-
tals, an increase in a variation of the quick ratio leads to more innovative search.3 Unlike
for-profits, nonprofits irrespective of sector operates on the brink of solvency (Calabrese
2011). Calabrese (2011, 867) demonstrates that, despite concerns in popular discourse, the
average nonprofit does not suffer from too much accumulated wealth, but from too little.
Both quick ratio and accumulated wealth assessment fall under a suite of financial metrics
used to assess the financial standing of an organization. When a nonprofit is financially
vulnerable, it will stay away from choices that involve risk and innovation. But robust
finances would allow it to take more risks and serve a larger constituent than before.
H1 : Increase in financial performance will lead to more risk taking in a nonprofit.
Salge (2011) tests for a curvilinear relationship between slack and innovative search.
There is no reason to believe that financial status of a firm will have a linear impact on risk
taking behavior. Calabrese (2011) argues that most nonprofits operate on the brink of fi-
nancial solvency. Thus, at lower levels of financial solvency, but above levels of financial
vulnerability, a nonprofit will be more concerned about securing its future operations and
thus may not be inclined to take risks. Only when it is performing above average on var-
ious financial metrics, will it have the necessary confidence to take additional risk. This
additional dimension modifies the first two hypotheses:
H2 : At low levels of financial performance a nonprofit will take minimum or no risk. The
propensity to take risk will sharply rise, as fiscal performance crosses average levels.
Finally, a nonprofit does not operate in a vacuum. The state of the economy impacts
3Salge (2011, 195) uses the ratio of public hospital quick assets, or the sum of its cash and marketable
securities, to public hospital liabilities to measure financial slack.
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the level of confidence in all firms. There is no reason to believe that this will be different
for a nonprofit. Most nonprofits receive funds from a variety of sources (such as private
donors, government, and foundations) and streams (such as membership fees, grants, and
contracts) (Sontag-Padilla, Staplefoote, and Gonzalez Morganti 2012, vi). Each of these
funding sources and streams are effected by the larger economy. Even if a nonprofit is
demonstrating robust finances, in an austere economy it would take less risk in compari-
son to times of economic prosperity. Thus, the above expectations will be conditioned by
ups and downs in the local economy.
H3a : The linear relationship between financial performance and nonprofit risk taking will
be conditioned by the state of the local economy.
H3a : The curvilinear relationship between financial performance and nonprofit risk taking
will be conditioned by the state of the local economy.
3.4 Model
I propose a simple model to test the above hypotheses:
RISK = f (FINC+Controls) (3.1)
Where RISK is the dependent variable and any measure of risk taking in nonprofit orga-
nizations. FINC is any measure of financial performance in nonprofit organizations. The
Controls are other factors besides financial performance that impact nonprofit risk taking.
This model can be further modified to address the possibility of a curvilinear relationship:
RISK = f (FINC++FINC2 +Controls) (3.2)
44
Where the squared FINC2 helps us measure a possible nonlinear relationship between
nonprofit financial performance and nonprofit risk taking. We can further modify this
model into a multiplicative-interaction model to test the conditional effect of local econ-
omy on our key predictors.
RISK = f (FINC+FINC2 +ECON +FINC ∗ECON +FINC2 ∗ECON +Controls)
(3.3)
Where ECON captures the state of the local economy in which the nonprofit firm operates.
3.5 Conclusion
Once we have made a concession for the nondistribution constraint, argues Jegers
(2008, 110), a discussion of nonprofit financial management will not be remarkably dif-
ferent from for-profit finance or corporate finance. This study hopes to demonstrate that a
key facet of for-profit finance differs from nonprofit finance. Specifically, organizational
risk and financial performance has a long history in the for-profit literature. The study
proposes a theory of a reverse relationship as seen in for-profits, where better financial
performance would induce a nonprofit to take more risks. Of course, organizational risk
looks different in nonprofit and for-profit. While a for-profit may innovate and take risk by
adding a new product line to expand market share, a nonprofit may stretch its limits by ex-
panding, say a soup kitchen facility or an additional free health clinic. The next step in this
study is to acquire data to test the proposed theory and hypotheses. A panel of compara-
ble nonprofits over several years would be the ideal testing ground for the proposed model.
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4. DOES DECENTRALIZATION HURT LOW-INCOME STUDENTS?
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, LOCAL REVENUE, AND
INCOME-BASED ACHIEVEMENT GAP IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS
4.1 Introduction
Deficiencies that start in school have lifetime consequences for disadvantaged students.
Gaps in educational attainment of poor kids and their peers is a serious education policy
concern. Scholars have argued that achievement gaps limit opportunities of marginalized
children in higher education, employment, and earnings (Jencks 1992; Murnane and Levy
1996; Ogbu 1994). Reducing and eliminating these gaps is seen to contribute positively
in promoting broader social equality, with respect to health, crime and family structure
(Jencks 1992). While racial and ethnic disparities in education have drawn extensive at-
tention from policy makers and scholars, the plight of poor students within the present ed-
ucation system has been somewhat neglected. The present study pushes us to reconsider if
education policy in the US, based on “the principles of local financing and local control,”
(Card and Payne 2002) is structured in a way that is conducive to reducing achievement
gap between low-income students and their peers, referred to as the income-based achieve-
ment gap in the rest of this study.
Centralization versus decentralization has been a long standing debate in US education
policy (Ferris 1992). Local school districts in the US have been given considerable latitude
in financing, staffing, and in making various other key administrative decisions (Brimley,
Garfield, and Verstegen 2005). In addition, they generate a substantial portion of their rev-
enue through local tax efforts, besides compensatory intergovernmental transfers, which
gives them further control over key policy outcomes. School districts decide on the level
46
and the extent of centralization and decentralization of various administrative and financial
functions within their constituent schools. The logic of this highly decentralized bureau-
cratic system is fairly simple. As proposed by Oates et al. (1972); Oates (1999), the basic
decentralization theorem is about delivering services closer to its beneficiaries or recipi-
ents. Local governments are better informed about the social and economic conditions of
the locality they serve (Hayek 1945). Therefore, decentralization gives local policy mak-
ers, in this case public school districts, the opportunity to create a system within which
the unique educational needs of a target population is better addressed. Some recent cases
have shown that decentralized school districts have been successful in reducing achieve-
ments gaps (for an overview see, Leithwood 2010).
There is in fact mixed evidence to substantiate the argument that decentralization can
help meet key education policy outcomes. Here I ask if decentralization, specifically ad-
ministrative decentralization, as a policy tool implemented by school districts can enhance
equity and reduce the income-based achievement gap. While case studies and anecdotal
success stories abound, rigorous empirical analysis backed by theory on this topic have
been missing. I leverage the variation in the degrees of administrative decentralization
adopted in Texas public school districts to test these expectations. In a sample of over
1000 Texas public school districts over 18 years, I demonstrate that placing more adminis-
trators on school campuses instead of in central offices may increase the achievement gap
between low-income students and their peers. While a battery of factors may contribute
to this problem, I argue they all stem primarily from “elite capture” that happens within
heavily decentralized systems. To push this argument further, I introduce local revenue as
a conditional factor. I show that when school districts source a higher percentage of their
revenue from local resources, an increase in administrative decentralization, on average,
increases the income-based achievement gap in Texas public school districts.
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4.2 Achievement Gaps in Education
Achievement gaps across student groups are among the most pressing education pol-
icy challenges in the US and one with a long standing history (Ladson-Billings 2006;
Hanushek 2010). The landmark Brown v. Board of Education (1954) ruling of the US
Supreme Court initiated some of the earliest discussions and policies to reduce racial dis-
parities in educational outcomes and reversed legal segregation in public schools (Ladson-
Billings 2006).1 The influential Coleman report looked at the gap in student performance
across grades and made a further case against racial concentration in schools (Coleman
et al. 1966). Subsequently, gaps in Black-White and Hispanic-White achievement nar-
rowed in the 1970s and 1980s but widened again starting in the 1990s even though income
differences between racial groups narrowed during this time (Lee 2002). In light of these
persistent achievement differences, it is no surprise that the 2001 No Child Left Behind
(NCLB) Act explicitly required that demographic subgroups make adequate progress on
yearly state exams.
Has education policy been successful in reducing achievement gaps? Hanushek and
Rivkin (2009) argue that several concurrent policy innovations and economic, demographic,
and social changes went hand in hand with efforts to curb racial achievement gaps, thus it
is hard to tell if specific policies worked. Studies that made that attempt (Cook et al. 1984;
Schofield 1989; Crain and Mahard 1978) suffer from small sample size, omitted variable
bias, and lack of statistical power in explaining key educational outcomes (Hanushek and
Rivkin 2009). Jencks (1992) argues that income inequality, differences in family structure,
and school spending, among other standard explanations for the Black-White achievement
gaps, lack explanatory power. Furthermore, Black-White and Hispanic-White achieve-
ment gaps have followed separate trends, which limit generalizations (Lee 2002). How-
1Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954).
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ever, the presence and persistence of the gaps in educational outcomes is hard to ignore
(Hanushek 2010). The initial narrowing of the Black-White achievement gap sparked ex-
tensive research (see, Grissmer, Flanagan, and Williamson 1998; Smith and O’Day 1991)
and scholars have offered myriad factors that they argue affect racial and ethnic achieve-
ment gaps. These factors include: socioeconomic and family conditions, such as educa-
tional attainment, family income, poverty, and single household; youth culture and student
behaviors, such as motivation and effort for learning, alcohol and illicit drug usage, and
crime; and finally, schooling conditions and practices, such as instructional resources,
teachers, course taking, dropout rate, and segregation (Lee 2002).
In recent times scholars and commentators have argued in favor of studying gaps in
the achievements of students based on income, as opposed to just racial and ethnic dif-
ferences (for an overview see, Ladson-Billings 2006). Compensatory funding programs,
such as Title I, and remedial programs, such as Head Start for improving school readi-
ness of low-income children, have been key policy initiatives to address the challenges
of raising performance of low-income students. However, the performance of disadvan-
taged students has not improved and, as some scholars argue, compensatory programs gave
rise to the concentration of high-poverty schools (Alberger et al. 2009), which eventually
prompted some initiatives on income-based school integration (Grant 2009; Kahlenberg
2003, 2007).
In the era of racial desegregation, policy focus was on making additional resources
available to every child, to ensure everyone had an equal shot at a quality education (Al-
berger et al. 2009).2 Unfortunately, channeling resources toward high poverty schools has
yielded limited results in improving equity and has somewhat dampened the enthusiasm
for implementing such programs (Hanushek 2010). Various National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics reports, such as those published in 2007 and 2009, paint a bleak picture.
2Alberger et al. (2009) offer a nice discussion of income-based achievement gaps in US schools.
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According to a 2007 report of the National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP),
there is a 24 and 26 points difference in reading and math scores respectively, between 8th
graders eligible for free- and reduced-price meals and their more affluent peers (National
Center for Education Statistics 2007). According to the report, this trend of low-income
students lagging behind remains fairly unaltered since 1996.
The Coleman report shifted focus away from the classroom and to the role that family
and peers play in driving academic performance (Coleman et al. 1966). In fact, it proposed
that family and peers have a far stronger impact on student performance than schools, a
theme that had substantial impact on subsequent policy formulation. Hanushek (2010)
notes that despite the impact of outside school factors on student performance, one of the
key policy tools to deal with income-based achievement gaps lies in altering the opera-
tions of schools. Thus, we need to take a fresh look at some of the core features of the
education system, crafted through policy deliberations, and the incentives that it creates to
see if it aligns with the goal of reducing income-based achievement gaps. In this regard,
I study decentralization policy, which has received some attention as a means of reducing
achievement gaps in schools.
4.3 Decentralization in Schools
As, Card and Payne (2002) note, the foundation of the public education system in the
US are “the principles of local financing and local control” or decentralization. In a multi-
tiered government system, decentralization refers to the removal of core resources from
top to lower levels of the government (Bolleyer and Thorlakson 2012). These resources
may be fiscal, jurisdictional, or administrative. Decentralization efforts within school may
refer to a large number of different approaches and scholars call for caution when compar-
ing them (Ouchi 2006). School decentralization can be from central to state governments
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(Fiske and Ladd 2001; Walberg et al. 2000; Van Langen and Dekkers 2001), from state
governments to local school districts (Corcoran and Christman 2002; O’Day 2002), and
from local school districts to school campuses. I study this last form of decentralization.
While federal and state actors play important roles in setting the tenor of US edu-
cation policy, local school districts are the dominant local governance structures for the
US school systems. They are key institutional actors in systemic education policy imple-
mentation and reforms, especially those related to instructional leadership, organizational
reorientation, and equity (Rorrer, Skrla, and Scheurich 2008; Brimley, Garfield, and Ver-
stegen 2005). Local school districts raise a large chunk of their own revenues, primarily
through property taxes, and also receive additional funds from the center and state through
intergovernmental transfers (Wenglinsky 1997). They control the flow of resources and
co-ordinate the activities of public school systems, spearheaded by superintendents and
their assistants at the district level (Brewer 1996). Districts have departments dedicated to
various functions. Decisions made by these departments directly impact the subordinate
schools. At the school level, principals, assistant principals, and departmental heads over-
see the day-to-day administration of schools (Brewer 1996). They receive assistance from
professional/“paraprofessiona” support staff, such as psychologists and teaching aides,
and “nonprofessional” staff, such as secretarial staff, transportation personnel, and build-
ing maintenance workers (Brewer 1996, 112). In sum, administrators play a key role
within this system.
To ascertain if school districts are more or less decentralized, we can compare the
extent to which administrators are moved down to school campuses or concentrated in
district headquarters. While these choices should be ideally guided by their impacts on
educational outcomes, these decentralized bureaucracies take a bad rap for being exces-
sively centralized in general and face pressures to continuously decentralize. For instance,
some argue that teachers have little freedom over “what to teach and how to teach it” and
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principals have insufficient personnel authority (Brewer 1996). Not surprisingly, much of
education policy reforms in the latter half of the 1980s were predominated by “decentral-
ization, professionalization, and bottom-up change as key concepts, as reformers focus
on the change process and active involvement of those closest to instructions” (Smith
and O’Day 1991). School districts are increasingly “decentralizing administrative control
from school board to individual schools, and granting site-level autonomy over budgeting,
personnel, curriculum, and instruction” (Garda Jr and Doty 2013, 22). In fact, in the ex-
tensive work of Hanushek (1986, 1989, 1994) it is seen that increased spending on school
resources have limited positive impact on overall student achievement. The policy rec-
ommendation is to increase administrative decentralization in school systems, specifically,
give principals more power over mentoring, hiring, and firing teachers (Rivkin, Hanushek,
and Kain 2005).
4.4 School Decentralization and Educational Outcome
Wallis and Oates (1988) discuss the economic welfare increasing opportunity that de-
centralization provides in the public sector, by tailoring levels of consumption to local
needs and bringing decisions closer to service recipients. While centralized systems tend
to produce a common level of public service for all jurisdictions, local systems can tai-
lor the output of a given public service to the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous
local groups (Oates et al. 1972). Thus, local providers of public service can overcome
the problem of information asymmetries that arise from heterogeneous preferences among
large group of service recipients. Recipients in turn, if dissatisfied, can move to a more
preferred jurisdiction or vote with their feet (Tiebout 1956).
Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2008) offer a summary of the key extensions of
this basic argument. In some instances, gains from economies of scale attained through
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centralized provisioning of a public good are outweighed by the match that can be attained
between local government outputs and preferences of local recipients (Oates et al. 1972).
Inefficiencies may be created due to “cost-sharing, strategic precommitment, and lack of
responsiveness to regional benefits in the choice of projects resulting from a centralized
legislative process” (Lockwood 2002; Besley and Coate 2003). Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to monitor centralized delivery systems and therefore they are prone to bureaucratic
corruption (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005). Each of these arguments make a case for
decentralization.
How might decentralization impact educational performance? A small body of empir-
ical work, primarily cross national, points toward the general “policy closer to the people”
argument and its benefits (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2008, 2107). The key argu-
ments in favor of educational decentralization are: local governments have superior knowl-
edge of idiosyncratic local educational preferences (Faguet 2004); household decisions
and policy to decentralize are complementary goods (Behrman and King 2001); appar-
ent correlation is observed between school autonomy and improvement in primary school
performance (Eskeland and Filmer 2002); decentralization increases participation of par-
ents in school decision-making, which in turn positively impacts performance (Jimenez
and Sawada 1999); decentralization causes an overall improvement in school performance
(Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2008); school districts that devote more resources to
central administrators, versus those that invest more in campus administrators, have infe-
rior educational outputs (Brewer 1996). The key argument in the school-based decision
making literature is that principals and other key administrators on the school site have far
superior information, of the schools clientele and environment not available at the district
level, to improve educational outcomes (For an overview of school-based decision making
see, Ferris 1992).
Grosskopf and Moutray (2001) analyzed the changes in public high school perfor-
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mance in Chicago, between 1989 and 1994, after the introduction of site-based manage-
ment in 1988. The goal with this policy intervention was to render real local control” in
Chicago schools, by enabling teachers and parents that was expected to improve educa-
tional outcomes. However, Grosskopf and Moutray (2001) show that half of the schools
in their sample had an improvement in performance, offset by the other half that did not.
In summarizing success stories of school districts that have been effective in reducing
achievement gaps, Leithwood (2010) show several of them were highly decentralized dis-
tricts. For instance, in Florian, Hange, and Copeland (2000)s study, 11 out of 15 districts
“implemented site-based decision making teams responsible for such functions as staff
development, action research, data-driven decision making, and team facilitation” and re-
duced achievement gaps. A similar trend of site-based decision making, was also seen
in four Texas school districts in a study by, Skrla, Scheurich, and Johnson (2000) and
Skrla and Scheurich (2004). Cawelti (2001) discuss how six districts pushed for more
school-based management, including responsibilities for budgeting, and saw a reduction
in achievement gaps.
4.5 A Theory of School Decentralization and Income-Based Achievement Gap
Can decentralization reduce the income-based achievement gap? This question re-
mains unanswered by extant research.3 I argue that decentralization will increase income-
based achievement gaps within school districts. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) offer a
theoretical model which demonstrates that within a highly decentralized system, there is
3Various authors have suggested that decentralization may reduce regional inequality (for an overview
see, Ezcurra and Pascual 2008). However, Prud’Homme (1995) argues that decentralization can actually
increase disparities between regions. Within the US context, Peterson (1995) suggests that in the US federal
system, local jurisdictions are only capable of fostering economic development and are ill-equipped to attend
to the needs of the underprivileged. Each of these arguments are about disparities caused by decentralization
between regions, not within as is the case in this study.
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a greater possibility of elite capture of public resources. Money renders power and polit-
ical clout. I argue that local elites, that is non-low-income groups, would have a greater
sway on the preferred use of public school resources and key program decisions, which
will influence on-site administrators to allocate resources and set policy priorities in ac-
cordance with their preferences. Thus, when choosing between investing school resources
in remedial programs or advance placement programs, within a decentralized system, key
decision makers will be swayed by the needs of the local elites who we would expect will
prefer the latter. The needs of the poor non-elites, who start far behind their non-poor
counterparts, will likely go unfulfilled.
Poor children are usually racial and ethnic minorities, hailing from poor families that
are often unstable and single parent households. They have less time, money, encourage-
ment, and other “outside-school” factors that contribute to success in educational perfor-
mance. For instance, we know parent involvement in education improves performance.
Parents from low-income households are less likely to be involved and invested in the
educational performance of their children, attend parent-teacher meetings, and in general
fail to have a strong influence on various school policies that can positively impact their
children.4 Since within a decentralized system key decisions on resource allocation and
policy priorities are site based, the needs and demands of advantaged students, and their
more involved and vocal non-low-income parents, will take central focus. A confluence of
such factors, based on the elite-capture argument, will cause an increase in income-based
achievement gaps with increasing levels of decentralization among public school districts.
This leads to my first hypothesis:
H1: The income-based achievement gap is increased by administrative decentralization in
4 Sarason (1995) argues that more involvement by parents alters distribution of power in education policy
and this is harmful for disadvantaged students. Posey (2012) demonstrates that greater involvement of
middle- and upper middle-class parents in public schools tend to generate more community support for
issues relevant to the children of these parents and in turn exacerbate inequality in school districts outcomes
based on race, class, and residence.
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public school districts.
My basic argument about the detrimental impact of administrative decentralization on
income-based achievement gap can be further refined. Prud’Homme (1995) argues that
when decentralization is combined with redistributive policies, and tax dollars from the
rich are used to disproportionately benefit the poor, two things happen: the rich may leave
for more lightly taxed areas and the poor may move in from areas that offer lower benefits-
both of which make the policy unsustainable in the generous jurisdiction.
School districts in the US have three sources of revenue, federal, state, and, most im-
portantly, local. As Baker and Corcoran (2012) discuss, the level at which a school district
generates revenue from local sources is a function of its ability to raise tax dollars for its
schools. Thus, wealthier districts generate more local revenue than poorer districts. Com-
pensatory funding programs, such as Title I, are in place to even out funding gaps between
rich and poor districts. Extending the elite-capture argument, as the proportion of revenue
generated from local sources increases, school administrators will be more inclined to set
program priorities for advantaged students in those districts. Districts where local revenue
is not a significant funding source, the policy of decentralized decision making will be
more successful in reducing the income-based achievement gap. Thus, I argue that the
impact of administrative decentralization on the income-based achievement gap will be
conditioned by local revenue. This leads to my second hypothesis:
H2 : The marginal effect of administrative decentralization on the income-based achieve-
ment gap is positive and increases with greater reliance on local revenue in a school dis-
trict.
Interactive theories are symmetric. Therefore, the marginal effect of reliance on local
revenue on the income-based achievement gap is positive and increases with greater de-
gree of administrative decentralization in school districts.
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4.6 Model and Data
My empirical strategy is to first explore the impact of varying levels of administrative
decentralization on the income-based achievement gap and then the interaction of admin-
istrative decentralization and local revenue on this gap. Therefore, I test two separate
models:
I Gapit = f (D Adminit +Controls) (4.1)
I Gapit = f (D Adminit +L Revit +D Adminit ∗L Revit +Controls) (4.2)
Where, I Gapit is the achievement gap between low-income students and their peers,
D Adminit is the measure of administrative decentralization, L Revit , is the measure of
proportion of revenue of a school district generated by local sources, and Adminit ∗L Revit
signifies the proposed interactive theory between administrative decentralization and local
revenue. In addition, the vector of factors that may impact educational outcomes is cap-
tured by a list of Controls. While the first model tells us the effect of decentralization on
the income-based achievement gap, the second model tells us how this gap is impacted by
the interaction of administrative decentralization and local revenue.
I use a panel of over 1000 public school districts in Texas from 1993 through 2010, ob-
tained from the Texas Education Agency. Some data points are lost due to missing values.
Texas contains 8% of all US school districts (Meier and O’Toole 2011). These indepen-
dent local governments are diverse entities that encompass urban to rural, rich to poor, and
homogeneous to heterogeneous districts with taxing authority (Meier and O’Toole 2011).
Furthermore, for the present analysis these districts demonstrate variation in the level of
administrative decentralization and revenue generated through local sources and therefore,
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offer an ideal testing ground for the proposed theory and hypotheses.
4.7 Variables
Scholars have used average score differences between overall student groups on stan-
dardized tests and ratio of the scores of student groups to measure achievement gaps (Lee
2002). Others have used standardized test performance of students of different racial
groups within the same grade (Coleman et al. 1966). I measure income-based achieve-
ment gaps with the difference in the weighted TAAS/TAKS passing rate of low-income
students from the weighted TAAS/TAKS passing of their non-low income counterparts.5
TAAS or the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills was the standardized test in Texas
schools from 1991-2002. This changed to TAKS or Texas Assessment of Knowledge and
5Income-based achievement gap is computed as follows: PO is the proportion of all students in a school
district, which equals 1. O is the overall standardized exam pass rate in percentages for students in each
school district. PL is the proportion of low income students and is measured as by the percentage of students
in a school district who are eligible for free or reduced-price school lunch . Since the data gives the percent-
age of low income students, PL is derived by dividing the low income students percentage by hundred. Thus,
0PL1. The low income student TAKS pass rate is denoted by L. And N is the TAKS pass rate of non-low
income students. PN is the proportion of non-low income students, which is everyone not categorized as
low income or (1−PL). G is required measure of performance gap” in percentage. Thus,
(O∗PO) = (L∗PL)+(N ∗PN)
Or overall TAKS pass rate multiplied by the proportion of the overall student is the sum of Low income
students TAKS pass rate, multiplied with the proportion of low income students, and non-low income stu-
dents TAKS pass rate, multiplied by the proportion of non-low income students. Next, since PO = 1 and
PN = (1−PL),
O = (L∗PL)+N ∗ (1−PL)
Furthermore, by subtracting both sides of the equation with (L∗PL), we obtain,
O(L∗PL) = {N ∗ (1−PL)}
Next, dividing both sides of the equation by (1−PL), we obtain
N = {O(L∗PL)}/(1−PL)
With this value of N we can now compute the difference between the low income and non-low income
students as, G = NL Correlation coefficient between G and PL is 0.05, which suggests that this measure of
income-based achievement gap captures a phenomenon distinct from the low income category in general.
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Skills in 2003. Both were key performance benchmarks for students, teachers, and admin-
istrators in the state and informed much of the education policy debates.
The key independent variable is administrative decentralization, measured by the per-
centage of administrators on school campus out of all administrators in a school district.On
average the percentage of administrators appointed to school campuses, out of all adminis-
trators, in Texas school districts have been increasing. In addition, this measure of admin-
istrative decentralization has a negligible positive correlation with enrollment (r=.195; p=
0.000), suggesting that a higher level of administrative decentralization is a district policy
choice, separate from those motivated by increasing size of constituent schools.
The second independent variable of interest, especially in the conditional theory, is the
proportion of revenue generated through local sources. As Baker and Corcoran (2012)
discuss, 55 percent of combined local and state revenues in Texas are generated from local
sources and property taxes make up 86 percent of local revenue in Texas. This variable is
driven largely by local property values, which in turn in affected by district wealth. It is
fair to be concerned that the correlation between percentage of low income students and
the percentage of local revenue might be equal to or close to negative unity. However, in
reality there is a modest negative correlation (r= -0.316, p=0.000) between these variables,
as is also evident in the plot in Figure 4.1. Thus, in the sample we have a substantial num-
ber of low income students in wealthier districts to allow testing of the proposed theory.
Achievement gaps are a measure of educational outcome. Thus, I incorporate the
usual controls for educational production function. The percentages of students who are
African American, Hispanic, and low-income are incorporated as measures of task dif-
ficulty. It is important to note here that low-income students throughout this study are
defined as students eligible for free and reduced price lunch programs. To be eligible for
this program, in 2009, the annual income for a family of four was between $28,665 and
$40,793. Each of these variables are expected to negatively affect or increase income-
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Figure 4.1: Texas school district revenue generated locally (1993-2010)
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based achievement gaps. The average teacher salary (in 1,000 dollars), class size (number
of students per teacher), average teacher experience, percentage of non-certified teachers,
and per student instructional spending (in 1,000 dollars) are all measures of program re-
sources. Each of these variables, expect percentage of non-certified teachers, are expected
to reduce income-based achievement gaps. With more non-certified teachers the gaps are
expected to increase. Table 4.1 gives us the summary statistics.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for decentralization, revenue, and achievement-gap
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max
Overall TAAS/TAKS passing rate (percent) 72.60 13.05 5 100
Low-income TAAS/TAKS passing rate (percent) 63.18 15.70 0 100
Income-based achievement gap (percent) 18.67 14.42 -57 92.9
%(Campus Administrators/Total Administrators) .64 .13 .03 .98
% Local revenue .37 .22 0 .99
Average teacher salary (’000s) 35.81 5.89 20.18 70.72
Student to teacher ratio 12.75 2.40 2.63 57.4
Average teacher experience in years 12.07 2.29 1.7 21
% Non-certified teachers 2.44 4.46 0 93.33
Instructional expenses per pupil (’000s) 3.76 1.11 .88 20.65
Black Student (percent) 8.23 12.04 0 87
Hispanic Student (percent) 29.68 26.74 0 100
Low Income Student (percent) 49.65 18.85 0 100
(N=15,915)
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4.8 Findings
Table 4.2 address the first key question in the study: does decentralization, specifically,
administrative decentralization, increase the income-based achievement gap? In Model 1
we see that ceteris paribus with a unit increase in the number of campus administrators,
there is a 4.67 percentage point increase in income based achievement gaps. If we ac-
count for the autoregressive term, as seen in Model 2, then the impact comes down to 2.42
percentage points, but still remains statistically and substantially significant. The AR r.e.
model or Model 3 also confirms that holding everything else constant moving more ad-
ministrators to school campuses in an average school district-year increases income-based
achievement gaps by 2.30 percent points. Thus, we have strong support for H1.
In Table 4.2 Model 1, we see that as expected most of our measures of program re-
sources that is more average teacher salary (in 1,000 dollars), lower class size or students
teacher ratio, and greater per student instructional spending (in 1,000 dollars) reduce the
income-based achievement gap. Each of these variables are significant at standard statis-
tical thresholds. When we incorporate the autoregressive term, the positive impact of a
smaller class size is significant within the 90th percent confidence interval (Model 2) and
not significant in the AR r.e. model (Model 3). However, average teacher experience has
a statistically significant positive impact on income-based achievement gap across all the
three specifications. This indicates that while experienced teachers may improve overall
student performance, as demonstrated in the wider literature, as far as the achievement gap
between low-income students and their peers go, it seems to have the opposite impact. This
could be because, either experienced teachers give disproportionately more importance to
overall student performance or disproportionately less attention to disadvantage students.
This is an interesting finding, but not explored here. Another finding that is contrary to
expectations, though only statistically above the 90th percent threshold in the base model
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Table 4.2: Impact of administrative decentralization on income-based achievement gap
1 2 3
DV: Income-based achievement gap (percent)
Campus Administrators (proportion) 4.673*** 2.424** 2.305**
(0.13) (0.75) (0.72)
Lagged dependent variable 0.411***
(0.01)
Controls
Average teacher salary (’000s) -0.351*** -0.205*** -0.139**
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Student teacher ratio -0.298* -0.133 -0.055
(0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
Average teacher experience 0.417*** 0.253*** 0.253***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Non-Certified Teachers (percent) -0.058 -0.017 -0.009
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Instructional expenses per pupil -0.948* -0.618* -0.803***
(0.39) (0.26) (0.19)
Black student (percent) 0.201*** 0.109*** 0.131***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hispanic student(percent) -0.088*** -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Low income student (percent) -0.065*** -0.028** 0.035***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
constant 28.886*** 16.487*** 15.826***
(2.84) (1.94) (2.27)
R-Squared 0.572 0.657 0.565
N 15915 15861 15915
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Year fixed effect included
Two-tailed tests of significance * p¡0.05, ** p¡0.01, *** p¡0.001
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(Model 1) and not significant in the remaining specifications, is the impact of non-certified
teachers on income-based achievement gaps. An increased proportion of African Ameri-
can and Hispanic students does push up some of the income-based gap, as expected. The
impact of increasing the proportion of low-income students is, however, mixed. In the AR
r.e. specification it does increase income-based gaps in student achievement. I attribute the
opposite finding in the OLS specifications to the lack of districts effects in those models.
Next I discuss Table 4.3 and the core argument presented in this study.
Does the marginal effect of administrative decentralization on income-based achieve-
Table 4.3: Administrative decentralization, local-revenue, and income-based achievement
gap
1 2 3
DV: Income-based achievement gap (percent)
Campus Administrators (proportion) 0.857 0.475 1.887
(2.08) (1.40) (1.35)
Local revenue (percent) -2.826 -1.091 3.425
(3.19) (2.10) (2.00)
Campus Administrators * Local revenue 11.155* 5.872 1.408
(4.76) (3.14) (3.03)
Lagged dependent variable 0.407***
(0.01)
constant 31.835*** 18.221*** 16251***
(3.08) (2.12) (2.38)
R-Squared 0.575 0.658 0.568
N 15915 15861 15915
Controls not reported
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; Year fixed effect included
Models 1 & 2 OLS; Models 3 & 4 AR r.e.(district)
Two-tailed tests of significance * p¡0.05, ** p¡0.01, *** p¡0.001
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ment gaps increase with an increase in the proportion of local funding in school districts?
All the three specifications, suggest that it is the case. To understand the impact better, I
use the OLS Model 2 to create marginal plot in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 gives us the marginal effect of the measure of administrative decentraliza-
Figure 4.2: Marginal effect of administrative decentralization on income-based achieve-
ment gap using OLS model with year fixed effects and lagged dependent variable
tion on the income-based achievement gap at each level of the conditional variable percent
local revenue. The horizontal axis captures the entire range of the percentage of revenue
generated from local sources in Texas school districts, which runs from 0 to 100 percent
with a mean of 35.28 percent. The vertical axis on the right gives us the percentage of
observations and one on the left the marginal effect of decentralization on the dependent
variable. The interactive effect is significantly different from zero beyond local revenue
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of 22 percent or more. While most of the observations lie within around 50 percent of
local revenue, we see that with an increase in the percent of local revenue, administrative
decentralization in these school districts does increase income based achievement gaps.
This impact is lowest when local revenue is in the lower range, or close to 22 percent, and
highest when it is near 100 percent. Most of the impact is observed within the 22 to 50
percentage range given the concentration of observations there. Thus, I find support of
H2. How about the impact of local revenue on income-based gap, conditioned by percent
campus administrators?
Figure 4.3 gives us the marginal effect of an increasing proportion of local revenue
Figure 4.3: Marginal effect of local revenue on income-based achievement gap using OLS
model with year fixed effects and lagged dependent variable
on the average income-based achievement gap, contingent upon administrative decentral-
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ization. The horizontal axis captures the complete range of administrative decentralization
starting at as low as 2.53 percent and going all the way up to 98.31 percent, though most
of the observations fall within 50 to 80 percent range. The vertical axis on the right gives
us the percentage of observations and one on the left the marginal effect of local revenue
on the dependent variable. We can see a statistically significant relationship that suggests
when 46 percent or greater administrators are based on school campuses an increase in
local revenue increases income-based achievement gap. Thus, we find support for the
symmetrical argument that emanates from H2. Does this relationship hold when we alter
the model specification?
The AR r.e. model from Table 4.3 is used to plot Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. We see
Figure 4.4: Marginal effect of administrative decentralization on income-based achieve-
ment gap using AR model with year fixed effects and district random effects
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Figure 4.5: Marginal effect of local revenue on income-based achievement gap using AR
model with year fixed effects and district random effects
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that the tenor of findings hold with this different model specification as well, that is when
we include random effects for school districts. While the marginal corves are flatter in
these plots, as opposed to their OLS counterparts in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, the general
trend remains unchanged.
All these models, together, offer clear support for the assertion that the marginal effect
of administrative decentralization on income-based achievement gap is positive and in-
crease with an increase in funding sources from local revenue in a school district (H2).
Furthermore, the detrimental marginal effect of administrative decentralization on the
income-based achievement gap will be highest when funding sources from local revenue
is highest in a school district. In addition, leveraging the symmetric nature of interactive
theory, I conclude that the marginal effect of percent local revenue on the income-based
achievement gap will be positive and increase with the increase in the level of adminis-
trative decentralization in a school district. Also, the detrimental marginal effect of the
proportion of local revenue on income-based achievement gap will be highest when the
level of administrative decentralization is the highest in a school district.
4.9 Conclusion
The income-based achievement gap has received limited attention within the highly de-
centralized US education system. While there is mixed evidence on the ability of schools
to significantly reduce achievement gaps, following Hanushek (2010)s argument, I con-
tend that there is a difference between having the capacity to lessen existing gaps and
having an institutional structure and set of policies that can target this problem. Thus, I
take a fresh look at how the policy to decentralize and push administrators, who make key
decisions, to school campuses impact the income-based achievement gap.
The findings, from a sample of over 1000 Texas public school districts over 18 years,
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support my contention that when moved down to school campuses, administrators face
pressure from “local non-poors” to divert school resources to meet the needs and interests
of the children of the local elites. The needs of the disadvantaged low-income students
take a backseat and this, I argue, causes the income-based achievement gap to widen. The
elite capture argument is further substantiated when I introduce local revenue as a condi-
tional factor. Local revenue is a function of local property values in Texas school districts
and thus signifies the political clout and power derived from money. I show that when
school districts draw a higher percentage of their revenue locally, an increase in admin-
istrative decentralization on average increases income-based achievement gap. To reduce
this gap, school districts are better off centralizing their administrative cadre, especially
when they have abundant local resources. Administrators based in school campuses, with
more money at their disposal, seem to be ineffective in reducing the achievement gap be-
tween low-income students and their peers.
The obvious, and simplistic, policy recommendation from these findings will be to
have more administrators based on district central offices. But we also know that central-
ization, just like decentralization, is not a panacea. “Administrative blob” and its associ-
ated problems has already received much attention. Thus, further study is needed for us
to fully understand the mechanism through which administrative decentralization leads to
elite capture in education and thus to widening of the income-based gap. In addition, my
findings show that more experienced teachers seem to increase the income-based achieve-
ment gap, which is interesting in itself and calls for further study of how key players in the
delivery of education, such as teachers, impact this gap.
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Introduction
Financial incentive is the glue that holds an organizational coalition together. With-
out effective money management any organization will quickly disintegrate. But just like
we cannot manage all organizations similarly, we also cannot manage finances in all orga-
nizations the same way. For public and nonprofit organizations it is critical that resources
are managed carefully. Failure to do so can lead to organizational decline, which in turn
will contribute to failure in the delivery of key public goods and services. This dissertation
demonstrates that when it comes to money management, the organizational context mat-
ters. The three essays theoretically and empirically argue that be it revenue management,
innovation management, or cutback management, all financial management solutions must
take into account the “political, organizational, and institutional contexts.” (Kioko et al.
2011, i113)
What are the key findings? In the first essay (chapter two), we see that slack may
have dissimilar buffering potency. But if by buffering we mean fiscal slack will positively
impact performance at times of organizational stability or that it will completely deflect
any negative impact of a downward budget shock, we do not see evidence of that in public
organizations. We must not think of fiscal slack as a unified concept, but as an umbrella
term that subsumes a variety of slack resources. Each type of slack is unique and, there-
fore, will have different impact as a buffer. This impact will depend on the context of the
organization. Also, in the public sector, organizations that need fiscal slack reserves the
most, often do not have enough of it. In the second essay (chapter three), the key message
is simple and straightforward. Organizational performance and risk taking relationship is
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altered by the sector. The performance-risk link in for-profit firms are reversed in non-
profits, where risk and performance may have a positive association. In the final essay
(chapter four), we tackle with a specific organizational goal of public schools districts:
reducing the gap in educational achievement of students from two income groups. We see
that revenue choices in these heavily decentralized organizations may accentuate achieve-
ment gap. Decentralized organizations that push for more horizontal decision making may
be ideal for the for-profit structure, motivated by wealth maximization. But public organi-
zations that tackle with more complex goals of equity may often see remarkably different
outcomes as in this instance. In each of these three essays, context reigns supreme. These
studies also offer starting points for future work.
5.2 Future Directions
Starting with the second chapter, an obvious next step would be to dig deeper into
the concept of slack within public and nonprofit firms. There are several possibilities in
this regard. Bourgeois (1981) proposes several ways we can measure slack in an organiza-
tion. For instance, he talks about excess capacity in manufacturing firms, such as capacity
built into latter stages of a production process. He uses the example of how a major oil
corporation subsidiary may maintain approximately 6 percent excess refining capacity to
meet sudden changes in market demand. He proposes changes in administrative inten-
sity as another possible indicator for changes in slack. This is because, Bourgeois (1981)
argues, staff functions often serve to buffer technical cores within firms. Public and non-
profit firms usually cannot accumulate fallow resources without raising eyebrow or having
these excess resources taken away. Thus, storing slack in less obvious places, such as staff
functions, seems a natural choice. During times of turbulence and organizational stress,
managers can free up these resources and channel them to where it is most needed.
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Besides the bifurcation between absorbed and unabsorbed slack, as discussed in
the first essay, slack can also be may be considered operational or financial (Salge 2011).
Operational slack, as the name suggests pertains to excess physical capacity, such as pro-
duction facility and human resource. Financial slack indicates excess savings, pool of fi-
nancial resource, or even rainy day funds that managers may use on a discretionary basis.
Combining this categorization with absorbed and unabsorbed slack measures, we can de-
velop a more nuanced understanding of slack in organizations. Thus, we can think of slack
as not two, but four distinct categories as depicted in Table 5.1. Thus, an organization can
have absorbed operational slack, absorbed financial slack, unabsorbed operational slack,
and unabsorbed financial operational slack. This study does not look at the categories in
the first column of Table 5.1, in other words absorbed operational slack and unabsorbed
operational slack. It will be useful to understand if operational slack demonstrates the
same characteristics as financial slack.
Furthermore, within the context of K-12 education finance, there is a need for a
Table 5.1: Organizational Slack
Operational slack Financial slack
Absorbed slack Absorbed operational slack Absorbed financial slack
Unabsorbed slack Unabsorbed operational slack Unabsorbed financial slack
better theoretical and technical understanding of fund balances. We often hear politicians
and popular media attack the tendency of school districts to accumulate huge fund balance
reserves. The presence of such reserves is often used as a justification for funding cuts.
Studies of US local governments, such as municipalities, have revealed that various fund
balance categories can successfully predict better credit ratings. While credit rating is an
alternative and less direct measure of performance than the one used in this essay, it is
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useful to understand if fund balances in school districts serve the same purpose as those
in other local governments. There is evidence to suggest that fund balances may be used
for counter-cyclical stabilization of expenditures in municipal finance (Marlowe 2005).
The concept of counter-cyclical stabilization is not different from the idea of positive and
negative shocks used in this essay. So it would be useful to see if fund balances do have
stabilization impact on expenditures in schools. Again, there is some discussion on the
optimal level of slack in local governments. Specifically, scholars and practitioners have
argued that maintaining a 5 percent fund balance, of projected expenditure, is a good fi-
nancial management practice (Marlowe 2011). We need to understand if such thresholds
exists for school districts.
Continuing with the discussion of school finance, there are several possibilities for
further exploration in the third essay (chapter four). First, this essay only looks at the
gap in TAAS/TAKS or standardized test score for school students in Texas. There are
several other parameters that we can consider in this regard, such as college preparedness
and dropout rates. It will be useful to understand if the elite capture argument pans out
for these alternative measures of performance in Texas schools and also if we see simi-
lar trends in other US states. Finally, anecdotal evidence and personal conversations with
various school district administrators suggests that students who suffer from the nega-
tive impact of funding cuts the most, or any environmental turbulence for that matter, are
poor students in rich districts. This is a topic that stands at the intersection of the second
and fourth chapter. It will be beneficial to explore this topic further through a case study
method.
The second essay (chapter three) offers the opportunity for extensive future explo-
rations. The first task is to choose an empirical framework to test the proposed theory in
this study. This empirical context must have a clear measure of organizational risk, finan-
cial performance, and a vector of factors that may induce risk taking- all within the non-
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profit context. The federated grant making system United Way (UW) in the US offers one
such possibility. Paarlberg, Van Puyvelde, and Ghosh Moulick (2015) offer an overview
of the UW system. The authors note that by virtue of around 4 billion dollars of annual
contributions, UW is the largest community philanthropic organization in the US. They
point out that it is also the single largest recipient of private donations in the nation. UW
is a federated fundraising channel for local health and human service organizations, with
an emphasis on the local aspect, since the UW outfits raise and distribute resources within
a given geographic boundary or community(Paarlberg, Van Puyvelde, and Ghosh Moulick
2015). But, the authors note, over the last thirty years many UW outfits have experienced
decreased campaign yields and major losses in charitable marketshare, due to austerity
in the local community economy and competition from other fundraising campaigns. To
deal with the changing environment many UW outfits have altered their partner choices,
which is organizational risk-taking. This is because partnerships are built over time and
is a major source of UW’s credibility in the donative marketplace. Donors contribute to
UW because of their attachment to certain causes that UW supports. By building new
partnerships and severing old ties, various UW outfits are risking their donor base. There
is a variation among UW system organizations in their propensity to add or drop partners.
Some add and drop partners more aggressively than others. Is this choice, or risk appetite,
predicted by the financial standing of UW organizations? The answer to this, and other
related questions, will give us new insights about financial performance-risk relationship
in the nonprofit sector.
The next aspect that can benefit from further investigation is the concept of risk in
nonprofit organizations. Risk can manifest in strategic management decisions, such as the
aforementioned example, or in financial choices. In fact, the finance literature has focused
to a large extent on risk pertaining to a firm’s investment (Bromiley 1991). It would be
beneficial to extend our understanding of investment risks in nonprofits. Very few stud-
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ies have looked at investment or investment risks in nonprofits. Adelino, Lewellen, and
Sundaram (2015) is one of the few studies that looks at investment decisions in nonprofit
healthcare organizations. They conclude, among other things, that hospital investment is
sensitive to its cash flow. This cash flow sensitivity captures a partial risk, and as the au-
thors argue, demonstrates a trend similar to for-profit firms. But given the sample selection
in this study, a preponderance of hospitals with large asset bases, it is unclear if we can
generalize these findings to other nonprofits, such as an advocacy organization or a reli-
gious outfit. Also, hospitals often have a steady revenue base, which may set them apart
from most nonprofits. Thus, the verdict on financial risk taking in nonprofits is still out.
Similarly, we do not know much about risk taking in public organizations, another key
organization type that this study deals with. Kioko et al. (2011, i118) notes that public ad-
ministrators and government officials often do not share the same view on risk and return.
In such organizations, we often see a trade-off between political and financial risk. The
authors cite recent cases of such trade-offs in the San Diego pension crisis and derivatives-
based crisis in Jefferson county, Alabama (Kioko et al. 2011). A better understanding of
risk in both nonprofits and public organizations is therefore the need of the day.
Continuing with the research strategy adopted in this dissertation, a key step for-
ward would be to frame the performance-risk question within a major theoretical frame-
work. The resource dependence theory (RDT) will be particularly conducive in this re-
gard. As Malatesta and Smith (2011, 609) note, all organization face the potential (or
power) for dependencies. Malatesta and Smith (2011, 608) have successfully used RDT
to study how “joint-dependencies, supplier dependencies, and government dependencies”
impact the design of contracts between the Environmental Protection Agency and its sup-
pliers. Paarlberg, Van Puyvelde, and Ghosh Moulick (2015) have used RDT within a
multi-theoretical perspective to study UW grantmaking.
Kellermann (2014) discuss the new environment of fiscal austerity within which
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public and nonprofit managers operate today. In such an environment organizations from
alliances “to find resources despite the risks of loss of power and autonomy.” (Kellermann
2014, 25) RDT has implications for the performance-risk discussion in federated com-
munity based nonprofits. Perhaps these organizations take risks and join new alliances
under duress, as proposed by Kellermann (2014). Or perhaps the merits of an organiza-
tion’s financial performance is conditioned by resource dependencies (in addition to local
economy), in predicting the organization’s risk attitude. Either way, it will be useful to
understand if it is financial performance or resource dependence that has the most impact
in risk-taking behavior of nonprofit organizations.
5.3 Conclusion
This dissertation highlights three specific issues faced by public and nonprofit firms
to demonstrate that organizational context matters in the study of financial management.
Furthering the collective body of knowledge in public administration, was the express goal
of this research. But the questions raised here stem from important challenges faced by
mangers around the US, such as educating children in a low-income community, running
a soup kitchen, or offering free HIV-testing, while working around the fiscal constraints of
their organizations. Throughout the course of this research I have kept an open ear and eye
for issues on the ground, to understand the problems I address here from the perspective of
these managers. Thus, a theoretical approach to practical problems, is an accurate way to
describe the flavor of these studies. But I have not looked beyond the boundaries of the US.
Geography is the final frontier for scholars who are trying to better understand the impor-
tance of context in financial management. So it is apropos to conclude by suggesting that
for a more sophisticated understanding of each questions raised here, we must transport
them to foreign lands. Perhaps what works in the US, may not work in Norway, Romania,
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Kyrgyzstan, New Zealand, Bangladesh, or Thailand. But it is the knowledge of what does
not work sometimes and in some cases, that will fill the loop holes in our understanding
of the living breathing systems we call organizations, and help the discipline surge ahead.
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